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I. INTRODUCTION
During the Bush administration, opponents of the prosecution of the
war on terror routinely denounced it as a betrayal of American values.
The narrative went like this: the United States has a long-standing
commitment to human rights and due process, reflected in its domestic
criminal justice system's expansive protections, but after September 11,
2001, President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld, and their allies dishonored this tradition.
Consider the argument of Neal Katyal, the lead civilian lawyer for
Salim Hamdan, Osama bin Laden's driver. Katyal describes meeting his
client for the first time, when Hamdan asked him, "Why are you doing
this?" Katyal responded:
The reason that I am here is that my parents came to America
with eight dollars in their pocket.... They came to America for a
simple reason: they could land on its shores and they'd be treated
fairly and their children would be treated fairly. And when the
president issued this military order, which said, "If you're one of
them, if you're a green card holder"-as my parents were-"or if
you're a foreigner ... you get the beat-up Chevy version of
Justice. You get sent to Guantanamo. But if you're an American
citizen, accused of the most heinous crime imaginable, the
detonation of a weapon of mass destruction, you get the Gold
Standard. You get the American Civilian Trial." I told him that's
why I was so offended. Because we haven't ever had Us versus
Them justice.'
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I received valuable comments
from Lama Abu-Odeh, Muneer Ahmad, Seema Ahmad, Bill Bratton, David Cole, Arthur
Evenchik, Sara Feinberg, Emma Jordon, Laura Hankins, Aziz Huq, Neal Katyal, Jamie
Mayerfeld, Mitt Regan, Joanna Saul, Mike Seidman, Giovanna Shay, Andrew Wise, and
David Vladek. I acknowledge the work of my research assistants Kristina Joye, Jessica
McCurdy, and Ryan Warren, as well as the efforts of Jennifer Locke Davitt, Leslie Street
and the staff of the Edward Bennett Williams Law Library. Finally, I would like to thank
Sara Conrath and the staff of the N.Y.U. Review of Law & Social Change for their
excellent editorial assistance.
1. Neal Katyal, Paul & Patricia Saunders Professor of Nat'l Sec. Law, Georgetown
Univ. Law Ctr., Investiture and Inaugural Lecture for the Center on National Security and
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Katyal made the same point when testifying before Congress,
contrasting the Bush administration's proposed military commissions for
detainees held at Guantanamo with "the 'Cadillac' version of justice"
reserved for U.S. citizens.2
Having represented indigent defendants for six years in the local
courts of Washington, D.C., I was taken aback by Katyal's contention that
Americans receive a 'Cadillac' system of justice.3 But Katyal is hardly
alone. Consider the titles of three recent expos6s of the Bush
administration's policies in the war on terror. British human rights lawyer
Philippe Sands's new book is called Torture Team: Rumsfeld's Memo and
the Betrayal of American Values.4  New York Times reporter Eric
Lichtblau's investigation of the NSA spying program is Bush's Law. The
Remaking of American Justice.5 And the New Yorker's Jane Mayer has
just released The Dark Side: The Insider Story of how the War on Terror
Turned into a War on American Ideals.6 Each of these titles tells the same
familiar tale: the war on terror represents a sharp break from the past, with
American values and ideals "betrayed," American law "remade."
The truth is more complicated, and in this Article I seek to begin a
more sustained comparison between the wars on terror and crime.7 While
I share much of the criticism of how we have waged the war on terror, I
suspect it is both too simple and ultimately too comforting to assert that
the Bush administration alone remade our justice system and betrayed our
values. In this Article, I seek to turn Katyal's argument on its head and to
explore the ways in which our approach to the war on terror is an
the Law: The Principled War on Terror (Apr. 10, 2008), http://www.law.georgetown.
edu/webcast/eventDetail.cfm?eventD=543. See also Neal Katyal, Equality in the War on
Terror, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1393 (2007).
2. Military Commissions in Light of the Supreme Court Decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld: Hearings Before the Comm. on Armed Servs., 109th Cong. 243 (2006)
(statement of Neal K. Katyal, Professor of Law, Georgetown University).
3. Of course, some people in America do get something approximating the Cadillac.
See infra note 173.
4. PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD'S MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF
AMERICAN VALUES (2008).
5. ERIC LICHTBLAU, BUSH'S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2008).
6. JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR
TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008).
7. This topic is only starting to get the attention it deserves. Initial contributions that
have influenced my thinking include Aziz Z. Huq & Christopher Muller, The War on
Crime as Precursor to the War on Terror, 36 INT'L J. L., CRIME & JUST. 215 (2008), and
Dorothy Roberts, Torture and the Biopolitics of Race, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 229 (2008).
See also Atul Gawande, Hellhole, NEW YORKER, Mar. 30, 2009, at 36, 39, 44 (arguing
solitary confinement in domestic prisons constitutes torture and that "[o]ur willingness to
discard these standards for American prisoners made it easy to discard the Geneva
Conventions prohibiting similar treatment of foreign prisoners of war, to the detriment of
America's moral stature in the world").
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extension-sometimes a grotesque one-of what we do in the name of the
war on crime.'
By pursuing certain policies and using particular rhetoric domestically,
I suggest, we have rendered thinkable what would otherwise have been
unthinkable. Moreover, as the world's largest jailer, we are increasingly
desensitized to the harsh treatment of criminals. We have come to accept
such excesses as casualties of war-whether on crime, drugs, or terror.
Indeed, more than that, we no longer see what we do as special, different,
or harsh. Certain practices have become what David Garland calls "the
taken-for-granted features of contemporary crime policy."9 In part for this
reason, despite the mounting evidence regarding secret memos, inhumane
prison conditions, coercive interrogations, and interference with defense
lawyers, the Bush administration's approach to the war on terror went
largely unchecked and unchanged.
Many critics of the Bush administration's terror policies open with
some version of the question-how did it come to this? My Article seeks
to address the same question. Specifically, I will explore five areas in
which our domestic criminal system has informed our approach to the
war on terror: (1) the scope of our prison complex, (2) prison conditions
and prisoner abuse, (3) our harsh treatment of juveniles, (4) attacks on
judicial authority, and (5) undermining the role of defense counsel. In
addition, I will discuss the innocence movement, which I argue has
somewhat tempered the prosecution of both the wars on crime and
terror.
Before turning to the details, I want to outline how some other critics
have explained the forces that give rise to our current approach to the war
on terror. Perhaps the most common explanation for why America has
pursued such extreme measures is what might be called the Wartime
Overreaction Theory. In this view, civil liberties always suffer in times of
war. As Justice Brennan once put it:
There is considerably less to be proud about, and a good deal to
be embarrassed about, when one reflects on the shabby treatment
civil liberties have received in the United States during times of
war and perceived threats to national security.... After each
perceived security crisis ended, the United States has remorsefully
realized that the abrogation of civil liberties was unnecessary. But
8. John Parry makes a similar point about torture. Parry reviews America's historic
and current uses of torture domestically and internationally and concludes that "torture
may be compatible with American values in practice and with the legal system we have
constructed to serve those values." John T. Parry, Torture Nation, Torture Law, 97 GEO. L.
J. 1001, 1003 (2009).
9. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 1 (2001).
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it has proven unable to prevent itself from repeating the error
when the next crisis came along."
More recently, Eric Lichtblau frames the history of the American
criminal justice system as exercising "restraint over aggression" except in
times of war. In Lichtblau's account, the American tradition is to place a
"premium" on protecting "the rights of the innocent." Exceptions are few
and far between and concern times of national emergency, like World
Wars I and II and the ensuing Cold War. According to Lichtblau,
For much of its history, the American justice system has placed a
premium on ensuring that a society's zeal to rid its streets of the
guilty does not trample the rights of the innocent in its path and,
just as important, that the justice system includes enough checks
and balances, enough safeguards, to know the difference. There
have been, of course, the notable and in some ways predictable
exceptions, especially in times of national fear and crisis. The
Palmer Raids targeting some ten thousand suspected radicals,
socialists, and anarchists in 1919 were one; the internment of some
120,000 Japanese-Americans during World War II was another;
Senator Joseph McCarthy's Red Scare in the 1950s a third. More
often, however, the justice system has tilted toward restraint over
aggression."
The Wartime Overreaction Theory helps explain why Americans have
accepted practices that have outraged much of the rest of the world.
Foreigners might have the luxury to sympathize with the plight of those
locked up in Guantanamo or Abu Ghraib or secret prisons. But American
sympathies will naturally lie with the victims of the September 11
bombings and making sure it does not happen again. After all, America
was attacked, and it is natural-even typical-for states to respond
aggressively and with little regard for civil liberties in such circumstances.
Closely related is what might be called the Blame Bush and Rove
Theory. The argument here is that while war always leads to some level of
overreaction, the fear generated by September 11 has been stoked by the
10. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Ouest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in
Times of Security Crises, 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 11, 11 (1988). See also RICHARD POSNER,
NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 9 (2006)
("In times of danger, the weight of concerns for public safety increases relative to that of
liberty concerns, and civil liberties are narrowed. In safer times, the balance shifts the other
way and civil liberties are broadened."). For a useful debate on whether decision making in
times of emergency poses risks for civil rights and liberties, compare ERIC A. POSNER &
ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 64-
128 (2007) (rejecting Wartime Overreaction Theory) with David Cole, No Reason to
Believe. Radical Skepticism, Emergency Power, and Constitutional Constraint, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1329, 1342-54 (2008) (reviewing and disagreeing with POSNER & VERMUELE,
supra).
11. LICHTBLAU, supra note 5, at 23-24.
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Bush administration to bully opponents and win support for various harsh
measures. 12 In the words of 9/11 Commission Director Phillip Zelikow, the
problem was that "fear and anxiety were exploited by zealots and fools." 3
In this account, the Bush administration consistently and "successfully
invoked the threat of 'mushroom clouds' to win support, or at least
acquiescence, for the invasion of Iraq."14 By the time it became clear
Saddam Hussein had no weapons of mass destruction, the Bush
administration began warning of the risks of losing to terrorists in Iraq-
the new "central front" of the war on terror. 5 The name bin Laden
disappeared for awhile, only to reemerge once reports of "secret CIA
prisons, torture, and domestic spying"'6 surfaced.
David Cole's Enemy Aliens Theory also deserves our attention.
According to Cole, aliens have always been the first target during times of
crisis. The government gets away with it precisely because the restrictions
on liberty and privacy are directed at a group that is foreign, other, and
politically weak.17 Because foreign nationals have borne the brunt of the
war on terror's harshness, American citizens have not internalized the
costs."8 When citizens' rights have been limited, says Cole, the political
system has largely responded. In an effort to spur Americans out of their
current complacency, Cole argues that past harms inflicted on aliens
eventually expand to the rest of the population.19
I think there is some truth in each of the above explanations, and I
offer my Exporting Harshness Theory as a modification, not a rejection, of
the others. Wartime Overreaction has surely been part of the explanation
for the past seven years, but it does not explain why the United States
resorted to tactics that Europe resisted, despite the fact that hundreds
were killed in terrorist attacks in Madrid, in 2004, and London, in 2005.20
Nor does it explain why the United States government has sought to
extend executive authority and limit access to counsel for detainees much
12. See, e.g., Eugene Robinson, Editorial, Using Our Fear, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2006,
at A23.
13. Jane Mayer, The Battle for a Country's Soul, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 14, 2008, at
41,43.
14. Robinson, supra note 12.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 13 (2003).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 229.
20. Jamie Mayerfeld, The High Price of American Exceptionalism: Comparing
Torture by the United States and Europe after 9/11, at 9 (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author). Mayerfeld traces the differences in American and European responses to
terrorism to the fact that Europe has more fully embraced international human rights law.
Id. at 1-2.
Reprinted with Permission of the New York University School of Law
2009]
HeinOnline -- 33 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 335 2009
N Y U REVIEW OFLA W& SOCIAL CHANGE
more aggressively than did Britain or Israel-two countries which also
have experience responding to terrorism.2 Moreover, the reasonable
claim that crisis can produce overreaction too often shades into the more
doubtful one that, to quote Lichtblau, our peacetime criminal justice
system typically "tilt[s] toward restraint over aggression."
Similarly, Blame Bush and Rove is partially correct. For example, it is
clear that in areas such as executive privilege and secrecy the
administration used 9/11 as an opportunity to push an agenda that pre-
dated the crisis.22 Yet why did they succeed? Leaders who make bad
decisions ought to be held accountable, but in a country that holds
elections, voters cannot avoid all responsibility for the actions of elected
officials. As for Enemy Aliens, I agree with Cole that some of our most
punitive tactics have been tried first on non-citizens. But there is a risk in
advancing Enemy Aliens as the complete explanation. Unless we
accompany the Enemy Aliens Theory with some account of our domestic
criminal justice system's harshness, it becomes too easy to take the
Cadillac metaphor seriously.
So what to make of Katyal's Cadillac? I offer my criticism reluctantly
because I am sympathetic to the agenda of ensuring fair process for those
detained by the United States government. In characterizing the domestic
criminal justice system as he does, Katyal knows the Cadillac only appears
shiny and new in comparison with the awful condition of justice in
Guantanamo Bay. Moreover, he and others making similar claims23 are
likely adopting a stance long familiar to human rights lawyers, civil rights
advocates, and critical race theorists. The strategy requires first appealing
to what Americans believe their nation and its Constitution stand for, and
then highlighting the distance between the promise and the reality lived by
the client.24 Like Martin Luther King, Jr., the human rights lawyer is
21. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Checks and Balances in Wartime: American, British and
Israeli Experiences, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1906, 1908 (2004) (noting that while the American
response to terrorism followed the same path as responses in Britain and Israel, there is a
"dramatic difference in the degree to which the adjustments were made" in the U.S.).
22. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, No Checks, No Balances: Discarding Bedrock
Constitutional Principles, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF
TERRORISM 74, 91 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003).
23. See, e.g., JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWER 148 (2006) (explaining that the Bush administration's approach to fighting
terrorism "cast[s] doubt on this country's well-deserved reputation 'as the standard-bearer
for democracy and human rights' (citing Brief of Former American Prisoners of War as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners in Rasul v. Bush, Jan. 14, 2004, at 18-19)).
24. For a discussion of this strategy, see Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 63, 66 (Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary
Peller & Kendall Thomas eds., 1995) ("Nonwhite lawyers have passionately invoked legal
doctrine, legal ideals, and liberal theory in the struggle against racism. Their success is
attributable in part to the passionate response that conventional legalisms can at times
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asking America to "be true to what you said on paper., 25 Of course, the
advocate may be doing this armed with the same doubts that King had
about whether the nation meant it.
26
But the strategy-while a great one for Katyal's client and others like
him-is risky for the rest of us. America suffers no lack of enthusiasm for
the greatness of its legal system.27 Instead, our failure is to see our flaws.
Convinced that our system is the most rights-protective in the world, we
are insufficiently self-reflective. For the same reasons, we are often highly
suspicious of comparative or international reform models.2 ' These
tendencies have stunted the development of our criminal justice system.
Worse, they have left us in the unenviable position of having one of the
most punitive systems in the world while believing we have one of the most
liberal. Images like that of Katyal's Cadillac both reflect and reinforce this
state of affairs.
To put the point another way, consider the words of Muneer Ahmad,
who, like Katyal, is both a professor and Guantanamo defense attorney.
elicit."). Cf Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment.
Transformation and Legitimization in Antidiscrimination Law, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
supra, at 103 (describing the choices of the Martin Luther King, Jr. Federal Holiday
Commission to focus on a "celebration of progress toward racial equality while urging
continued commitment to this ideal").
25. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Speech at the Memphis, Tennessee Mason Temple:
I've Been to the Mountaintop (Apr. 3, 1968), available at http://www.americanrhetoric.
com/speeches/mlkivebeentothemountaintop.htm.
26. For an extended discussion of how King balanced his belief in the promise of
America with his disappointment in its failures, see MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, I MAY NOT GET
THERE WITH You: THE TRUE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 225-48 (2000).
27. See AM. BAR ASS'N, PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 58-59 (1999),
available at http://www.abanet.org/media/perception/perceptions.pdf (reporting results of
survey of opinions of U.S. justice system). See also Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the
Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. Soc. Sci. 173, 174 (2008) ("We are not a modest nation. We
frequently insist that the American criminal justice system ... is 'the best in the world."').
One of the costs of our self-satisfaction is that when confronted with allegations of abuse in
our own system, it is easy to argue that others are worse. As Philippe Sands reports, when
Major General Michael Dunlavey was criticized for allegedly allowing prisoner abuse at
Guantanamo Bay, one letter writer in his hometown paper defended the process at
Guantanamo. Would it be better, the author of the letter asked, to have "the Arab
sheikdom practices of amputation or decapitation, or perhaps Oriental jurisprudence
administered from the muzzle of an AK-47?" SANDS, supra note 4, at 39 (quoting Donald
F. Rutz, Letter to the Editor, Erie Judge, US. Legal System Defended, ERIE TIMES-NEWS,
Aug. 25, 2004, at 2).
28. Rosemary Foot, Exceptionalism Again: The Bush Administration, the "Global
War on Terror" and Human Rights, 26 L. & HIST. REV. 707, 708 (2008). See also
Mayerfeld, supra note 20, at 5 (many Americans believe that "the U.S. has no need of
international human rights law because its own rights protections are sufficient"). For a
robust defense of American exceptionalism, see Steven G. Calabresi, "A Shining City on a
Hill" American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court's Practice of Relying on Foreign
Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335 (2006). For Calabresi, "The whole point of being Americans for
many of us is that we are not Europeans; we are a special people, in a special land, with a
special mission." Id. at 1398.
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Ahmad's account of the bizarre world of Guantanamo Bay leads him to
conclude that "[t]he central cultural project of Guantanamo has been to
normalize what is, on first inspection, extraordinarily aberrant, and to
render intelligible the seemingly bizarre."29  For those who believe
Guantanamo Bay is an irredeemable human rights violation, it is
essential to demonstrate how aberrant it truly is. That is what Katyal
achieves with the comparison between Cadillacs and Chevrolets. My
discomfort comes from the fact that in contrasting the aberrant
(Guantanamo) with the normal (our domestic criminal justice system) we
become blinded to the profound abnormality of our domestic criminal
system. One of my goals in this Article is to counter this tendency by
raising questions about our domestic criminal system by turning a mirror
back on it.
There is one more reason to pay close attention to how the war on
crime has helped make the war on terror possible. It is the only way to
achieve change that sticks in how we fight the war on terror. In the
months following the release of the Abu Ghraib abuse photos, the
administration claimed the scandal was the work of a few "bad apples" and
that neither the administration nor the chain of command bore any
responsibility. Critics of this excuse questioned the notion that removing
the bad apples would solve the problem. It was more systemic, more
deeply-rooted, they argued.3 °
I think the critics were right then. In the waning days of the Bush
administration, as disapproval of the prosecution of the war on terror
mounted and a new administration prepared to take office, the bad apples
explanation reemerged. This time, however, the alleged bad apples are
not low-level officers but Bush, Rumsfeld, and Cheney themselves.3'
While placing blame on the leaders gets closer to the truth than accusing
front-line officers, there is one sense in which the bad apples explanation is
still unsatisfying. It lets some people-We the People-off the hook.
29. Muneer Ahmad, Resisting Guantdnamo Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization,
103 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 16, on file with author).
30. W.J.T. Mitchell, Sacred Gestures.- Images from Our Holy War, AFTERIMAGE,
Nov./Dec. 2006, at 18 ("Much has been written about the political significance of the Abu
Ghraib photographs, their scandalous and undeniable revelation that the American war on
terror has involved a widespread use of torture. Commentators Mark Danner, Seymour
Hersh, and Susan Sontag immediately argued that the images were only the tip of an
iceberg, symptoms of a much larger and systematic problem than a 'few bad apples' among
the United States soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison.").
31. Anthony Lewis lamented that the Bush administration's actions had "sapped the
belief of many Americans in the righteousness of their country." Anthony Lewis, Official
American Sadism, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 25, 2008, at 49. "[T]he cure," said Lewis, will
"come from leaders who reassert the primary place of law in the American character: from
a president who does not seek unrestrained power, from an attorney general and other
officials who respect the law. It is not too late to return to a government of laws, not men."
Id.
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After all, to suggest that we were led-against our essential
character-to do terrible things conveniently avoids some important
questions. What caused our leaders to imagine such harsh tactics? Why
did they think we would tolerate it? Why were they right?32  These
questions matter because although the Bush administration has left office,
unless we confront why they succeeded, many of the tactics they adopted
may survive their departure.33
Before turning to the specifics of my argument, I want to offer two
caveats. I will draw a number of analogies between tactics, practices, and
rhetoric adopted in the war on crime and those employed in the war on
terror. I am not arguing, however, that there is a jot-for-jot parallel
between how we have prosecuted the two wars. To the contrary, some
enormous differences exist. Some of the most notable distinctions of the
war on terror include: secret prisons for terror suspects, indefinite
detention without trial of the accused, and the systematic use of physical
brutality as a method of interrogation. While physical brutality to obtain
confessions was used extensively through the mid-twentieth century,34 and
still occurs occasionally, it is no longer widely practiced in domestic
criminal cases.35 Similarly, indefinite detention without trial and secret
prisons are unknown to our criminal system.
Second, when I discuss conditions of confinement or right to counsel,
for example, I am not asserting that our domestic prisons are as awful as
Abu Ghraib or that we deny lawyers to suspects domestically in the same
way that we have to those held at Guantanamo. My argument, I hope, is
more nuanced. I am interested in exploring continuities in places where
the prevailing wisdom has been to emphasize discontinuity. I want to
understand why we as a nation have allowed certain things to go on in our
32. Consider that, in at least one poll, Americans' support for torture of alleged
terrorists increased from thirty-six percent in 2006 to forty-four percent in 2008. Id.
33. For those who would suggest that the Bush administration were the bad apples
spoiling the rest of us pure ones, it is worth noting that Congress consistently refused to rein
in the executive branch. See LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM:
POWER, POLITICS AND LIBERTY 112 (2008). There are limits to this argument. Philippe
Sands has powerfully demonstrated that at least some of the Bush administration's actions
were done secretly. See, e.g., SANDS, supra note 4, at 92-93 (explaining how General
Counsel of the Department of Defense Jim Haynes "short-circuited the usual process" by
limiting internal circulation of a memo with proposed new interrogation techniques).
34. Jerome H. Skolnick, American Interrogation: From Torture to Trickery, in
TORTURE: A COLLECTION 105, 112-13 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004). Our nation's historic
use of torture domestically and internationally should cause us to pause before asserting, as
Anthony Lewis does, that "somehow this country has to reassert its historic repugnance at
the use of torture." Lewis, supra note 31, at 49. Indeed, a review of the evidence presented
in Skolnick, supra, Parry, supra note 8, and this Article, infra Section III, might help begin
to answer Lewis when he asks, "how did the United States government get into the
business of torturing prisoners?" Lewis, supra note 31, at 45.
35. But see Roberts, supra note 7 (discussing role of race in America's history of
torture and highlighting current interrogation abuses).
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name, even, in some cases, after we learned the truth about abuses in the
war on terror. To answer those questions we must pay careful attention to
what we do at home, to our own citizens, in our domestic criminal system.
Even with these caveats, I confess some ambivalence about my
argument. It, too, carries risks. Comparing tactics employed in the war on
terror with those used in the war on crime invites defenders of our current
anti-terror policy to say, "Stop complaining, we do this already." This is
not a hypothetical risk. As I was working on this part of the Article, I
watched Neal Katyal debate former federal prosecutor Andrew McBride
on NewsHour with Jim Lehrer. When Katyal objected to the fact that
Hamdan's lawyers were forced to wait until the eve of trial to interview a
high-security witness with potentially exculpatory information, McBride
responded with something along the lines of "when I was a federal
prosecutor in similar cases, that is how we did it."36 While my own defense
practice was in state court, and did not involve the sorts of cases that make
it onto NewsHour, my experience is that while our rules on paper favor
what Katyal argued for, our routine practice is as McBride portrays it.
Moreover, by placing our approach to the war on terror on a
continuum with how we fight the war on crime, I worry I may help to
normalize, or even justify, the egregious and inhumane. This is a tricky
issue, similar to a divide that marks the debate over torture. To
oversimplify, there are those who would treat torture as a categorically
unique form of state violence, comparable only perhaps to genocide.37
Others situate torture on a continuum with other forms of state violence
and coercion.3" Given what I have said so far, it is not surprising that my
36. See The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer." Military Trial Yields Split Verdict for Bin
Ladin's Driver (PBS television broadcast Aug. 6, 2008), available at http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/law/uly-dec08/verdict_08-06.html. Guantanamo Commander Rear Admiral
Mark Buzby employed a similar argument in defending prison conditions at Guantanamo.
Buzby argued that Guantanamo prison cells were modeled on domestic American prisons
and that Guantanamo detainees are treated as well. Teleconference: Department of
Defense Bloggers Roundtable with Rear Admiral Mark Buzby, Commander, Joint Task
Force Guantanamo 3-4 (Fed. News Serv., May 21, 2008) [hereinafter Roundtable with
Buzb]. For example, he said, Guantanamo detainees "get a shower every single day,
which is actually more than the [U.S.] Bureau of Prisons offers their high-security folks."
Id. at 3. In response to suggestions that Guantanamo detainees suffer from their isolation,
Buzby pointed to data suggesting that Bureau of Prisoners inmates are twice as likely to
need mental health services. Id. at 4. In sum, Buzby argued, it was wrong to suggest that
"[Guantanamo's] conditions are especially arduous or different than [what] a normal
prisoner might find in the Bureau of Prisons systems .... Id
37. John T. Parry, "Just For Fun " Understanding Torture and Understanding Abu
Ghraib, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 253, 257 (2005).
38. Id. Scott Shane puts the point this way:
When the Central Intelligence Agency obliterates a dozen suspected terrorists,
along with assorted family members, with a missile drone, the news rarely stirs a
strong reaction far beyond Pakistan. Yet the waterboarding of three operatives
from Al Qaeda-one of them the admitted murderer of 3,000 people as organizer
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sympathies lie with those who put torture on a continuum. I fear that
viewing torture as categorically different can sustain a perverse result: we
devote more attention to the (relatively) few individuals tortured in the
war on terror than to the much larger number of Iraqi civilians killed
during the same time period.39 By analogy, I would argue that singling out
our prosecution of the war on terror as categorically different runs a
similar risk. It invites us to avoid more difficult conversations about our
domestic war on crime.
II. THE SCOPE OF AMERICA'S PRISON COMPLEX
The first thing to understand about the American prison system is its
scope. We have the largest prison system in the world, by a wide margin.
As Figure 1 indicates, we also have the highest incarceration rates.4"
of the 9/11 attacks-has stirred years of recriminations, calls for prosecution and
national soul-searching.
Scott Shane, Torture Versus War, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2009, at WK1.
39. Cf Parry, supra note 37, at 258 ("Creating a separate category for an intentionally
narrow set of practices labeled and banned as 'torture' only functions to normalize and
legitimate the remaining practices that are 'not-torture."'). There is another cost to the
focus on torture. In the context of detention, government conduct can be quite atrocious
while arguably not meeting the legal definition of torture. Focusing only on those few
instances in which the standard is met can distract us from the larger number of cases that
might fail the torture test, but should nonetheless be condemned. This issue becomes clear
when Philippe Sands describes meeting Gita Gutierrez, an attorney representing
Mohammed al-Qahtani. Sands and Gutierrez have a difficult discussion regarding whether
the treatment of al-Qahtani at Guantanamo constituted torture. SANDS, supra note 4, at
161-62. Sands' conclusion at that point was that he needed to consult with an independent
expert because "I hadn't yet formed a clear view: there were issues of law and of fact, the
test was 'severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental."' Id. at 162. As a lawyer,
Sands is right. To make the case for torture, it would matter how long al-Qahtani was
forced to stay awake, stand without relief, be denied food, or isolated in a cell flooded with
light. But, as one of my students wrote to me after reading Sands' account: "One could
conceive of an entirely different consciousness-one in which seizing an individual, hooding
him and putting him on a plane, sending him to some island thousands of miles away from
anyone he knows and holding him there indefinitely without access to the outside world or
to his family without more could be torture." Seema Ahmad, Response to Torture Team
by Philippe Sands 1-2 (Seminar Response Paper, Georgetown University Law Center)
(Dec. 2, 2008) (on file with author).
40. For the incarceration rates for England, South Africa, Australia, China, Japan, and
India, see Haeyoun Park, Vu Nguyen & Shan Carter, Interactive Graphic: Prison
Population Around the Globe, NYTIMES.COM, Apr. 22, 2008, http://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2008/04/22/us/20080423_PRISONGRAPHIC.html. For all other
incarceration rates, see PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA
2008, at 35 (2008), http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTS_Prison
08_FINAL_2-1-1_FORWEB.pdf.
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Those numbers do not accurately reflect how much of an outlier the
United States truly is. Figure 2 shows the same countries in the same order
as Figure 1, reflecting from left to right those that incarcerate the most to
the least. Figure 2, however, highlights the relative wealth of each nation,
as measured by GDP per capita.4 The countries that, like the United
States, incarcerate at relatively high rates are all relatively poor countries,
such as Belarus and South Africa. Relatively wealthy countries such as
France and Italy all have low incarceration rates and appear on the right
hand side of the graph. This reflects the commonsense notion that wealthy
countries are better equipped to make the human capital investments that
allow for a reduced dependency on incarceration.42 This trend holds true
41. The data reflected in Figures 2 and 3 were derived by the author from the
following sources: Int'l Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database (Apr. 2008),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/weodataindex.aspx; World Bank, World
Development Indicators Database: Gross Domestic Product 2007 (July 1, 2008),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf; Central
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Field Listing-GDP (Official Exchange Rate)
(July 15, 2008), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-actbook/fields/2195.html;
U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base-Country Summaries (July 12, 2008),
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/tables.html.
42. Cf MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL
RATES OF INCARCERATION: AN EXAMINATION OF CAUSES AND TRENDS 13 (2003)
(explaining that programs that aim to raise high school graduation rates, provide family
therapy, and reduce drug addiction all cut crime more cost-effectively than does increasing
incarceration rates).
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across the board, except for one outlier. One of the world's wealthiest
countries sits at the far left of the graph, reflecting high incarceration rates
despite its relative wealth. That is the United States.
Figure 2
GP(nominal) per capita
Figure 3 makes the same point in a slightly different way. The
countries are again arranged in the same order as Figure 1, with the bars
showing their relative incarceration rates. This time, however, the
countries that have similar wealth levels as the U.S. are bolded dark. The
others have lighter-colored bars.
Figure 3
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To this point my premise has been that our position atop the world's
incarceration leader board is evidence of punitiveness. But perhaps our
high incarceration rates simply reflect that we have a lot of crime. There is
some truth to this. America's relatively high rate of violent crime partially
explains our large prison population. Although our overall crime rate is
not especially high (most people are surprised to learn, for example, that
Sydney, Australia, and London, England, both have higher burglary rates
than New York City), homicide rates in the United States are three to five
times higher than in most industrialized countries.43
But the crime rate does not explain all, or even most, of America's
prison expansion. To understand why it expanded, one must compare
domestic trends in crime and incarceration over the past forty years.
Incarceration rates were largely steady for most of American history;
between 1940 and 1970, for example, the nation averaged about 110
inmates per 100,000 people." The increase began in the mid-1970s and has
continued an upward trajectory since.45  The initial prison growth
coincided with a rise in crime, but even as crime declined for nearly fifteen
years we continued to send more and more people to prison every year.46
Indeed, by 2002, the nation's violent crime rate had declined to 1970
levels,47 yet the incarceration rate was almost seven times what it had been
in that year.48
The fact that prisons have grown regardless of whether crime goes up
or down suggests that our prison growth stems primarily from our response
to crime, rather than from crime levels themselves. In particular, in the
last forty years we have made three policy choices that have driven prison
growth. First, we arrest greater numbers of drug offenders than we once
did.49 Second, we choose prison for a higher percentage of those arrested
for all crimes.5" Third, those who go to prison now serve longer terms."
43. MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 25-26 (2006).
44. Id. at 18.
45. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 495 [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS] (2002), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/sb2002/sb2002-section
6.pdf [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS].
46. MAUER, supra note 43, at 94-95.
47. Id. at 95.
48. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 45, at 495.
49. BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 46 (2006) (reporting
a "fourfold growth in drug arrest rates from the late 1960s to 2001"). Because self-
reporting studies show drug use declining between 1979 and 2000, there is little evidence to
suggest that the increase in arrests was due to increased drug use, rather than stepped-up
law enforcement. Id. at 47-48.
50. Violent crimes decreased throughout the 1990s, but the chance that an arrest
would result in prison time more than doubled. Id. at 43.
51. Between 1980 and 2001, the length of the average prison sentence increased about
sixty percent. This increase, plus the increase in the likelihood of imprisonment, meant that
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International comparisons also show that America's sentencing policy
is punitive in comparison with much of the rest of the world.52 Burglars,
for example, receive an average sentence in the U.S. that is more than
three times as long as the average equivalent Canadian sentence and more
than twice as long as the average sentence in Britain. 3 The story is the
same for drug offenses. In the United States, twenty-six percent of drug
offenders are serving terms of greater than ten years, while only eight
percent are serving similar sentences in Britain.54
Whether American laws accurately reflect the attitudes of the public is
a complicated question. Every year in my criminal procedure class I show
Snitch, a film about our nation's drug laws and the role of informant
testimony.55 The documentary ends with the story of Clarence Aaron, a
twenty-three-year-old man from Mobile, Alabama, who is tried for driving
some friends and drugs between Louisiana and Alabama. Because of
federal conspiracy laws, Aaron can be punished for the full amount of
drugs involved in the conspiracy (even though he did not know the precise
amount). Because of informant testimony, he can be convicted based
solely on the word of one of the other people in the car, even though no
drugs were ever recovered. Aaron, who had no prior run-ins with the law,
was found guilty, and the movie ends with the filmmakers asking one of
the jurors how much time he thought Aaron should have received. With
the camera focused on Aaron sitting in his cell, the viewer hears the juror
say, "Well, I wouldn't have thought a large number of years.... I don't
know-three to five years, maybe something like that." When the
filmmaker tells the juror that Aaron had received three life sentences, the
juror is visibly dismayed. We are left with the scene of Aaron sitting in the
cell he will occupy for the rest of his life, as the juror says, with sorrow,
"I'm surprised at that, I really am, that harsh a sentence. He seemed to be
a pretty promising boy.
56
the incarceration rate for violent crime has nearly tripled despite the decline in violence.
Id. at 44.
52. See JAMES 0. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN EUROPE AND AMERICA 4 (2003) ("The Western European
media regularly runs pieces expressing shock at the extreme severity of American
punishment.").
53. Mauer, supra note 43, at 35. I do not mean to overstate the evidence here. See,
e.g., James B. Jacobs, Facts, Values and Prison Policies.- A Commentary on Ziming and
Tonry, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 165, 168 (David
Garland ed., 2001) ("Comparative time served data, holding criminal conduct and prior
criminal record constant is very hard to come by .... I do not believe that criminologists
have the data to back up the constantly repeated assertion that American offenders serve
hugely greater sentences than similarly situated offenders in other countries.").
54. James Lynch, Crime in International Perspective, in CRIME 11, 36 (James Q.
Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 1995).
55. SNITCH (PBS Video 1999).
56. Id.
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While Snitch presents a compelling example of a case where many
observers will share the juror's shock upon learning the penalty for
violating the law, there is also evidence to suggest that Americans have
more punitive views on punishment than citizens of other countries to
which we normally compare ourselves. For example, in one international
survey respondents were asked to identify the appropriate penalty in a
case involving a twenty-one-year-old second-time burglar who had stolen a
television set. Fifty-six percent of Americans questioned chose prison,
compared with an international average of thirty-two percent."
Together this suggests that the size of America's prison system cannot
be explained solely by pointing out that America is a violent nation. We are
violent, but our prisons are large because of how we have chosen to respond
to both violent and nonviolent crime, particularly over the past forty years.
As a nation, when faced with new or pressing social challenges, we
increasingly turn to criminal prosecution and incarceration. This is not
only true of law-and-order conservatives or Republicans trying to create a
wedge issue for Democrats.58 Our incarceration inclination has become
ingrained even among unlikely advocates. This becomes clear from Marie
Gottschalk's careful examination of international differences in the
domestic violence movement.5 9 In both Britain and the United States, the
fight against domestic violence grew out of the feminist movement in the
1970s. In the United States, advocates for battered women ended up
turning to the criminal system for solutions and became leading voices for
longer prison sentences and mandatory prosecution policies. By contrast,
their allies in Britain and throughout Europe were much more likely to
focus on social policy rather than penal policy, arguing for housing, health
services, and welfare benefits that would allow women to escape violence
through economic independence.6'
Civil rights advocates in the United States, like their domestic violence
counterparts, have shown a similar inclination to seek solutions in criminal
57. PAT MAYHEW & PHILIP WHITE, HOME OFFICE (U.K.) RESEARCH & STATISTICS
DIRECTORATE, THE 1996 INTERNATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY 5-6 (1996).
58. For the best accounts of the political forces that have supported the nation's
punitive turn, see GARLAND, supra note 9, at 131-35 (arguing "the finer points of
penological realism become secondary considerations, easily subordinated to political
ends"); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 510 (2001) (describing expansion of criminal law as "a story of tacit cooperation
between prosecutors and legislators"). See also KATHERINE BECKETE?, MAKING CRIME
PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 5 (1997) (arguing that
"crime-related issues... are socially and politically constructed"). See generally David A.
Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995) (detailing
social fears in late 1980s that led Congress to pass unequal crack and cocaine sentencing
guidelines).
59. MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 139-64 (2006).
60. Id.
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prosecution-despite the toll that our nation's high incarceration rate has
taken on the black community. Consider the debate that erupted in
response to the aggressive criminal prosecution of black teens in Jena,
Louisiana, for fighting with white schoolmates.6 Even as protestors
demanded that prosecutors drop or reduce the charges against the black
teens, they simultaneously called for the Department of Justice to bring
more criminal prosecutions against whites for hate crimes.62 Minister-
activist Al Sharpton suggested that federal criminal law should be
expanded to cover juveniles who commit hate crimes.63 Representative
Artur Davis, from Alabama, complained that the Department of Justice
had charged only twenty-two people with hate crimes in 2006, compared
with seventy-six people ten years earlier.' And when a prosecutor
testified before a congressional panel that federal law did not allow for the
prosecution of juveniles for the crime of hanging a noose over a tree, he
was roundly booed by a room of mostly African-American observers.65
I am not arguing that criminal prosecutions are inappropriate in the
case of domestic violence or hate crimes. Instead, I use these examples to
show how our high incarceration rates have been produced by, and in turn
have led to, a deeply-rooted tendency to pursue penal responses to social
problems. This is the backdrop against which we must understand
America's punitive approach to fighting the war on terror.
61. For a detailed account of the Jena controversy and the legal/ethical considerations
of the prosecution, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting the Jena Six, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
1285 (2008). In brief, the turmoil in Jena, Louisiana began in the beginning of the 2006
school year when a group of black students sought to eat lunch under a tree in the center of
campus, a place typically frequented by white students in this highly segregated town. Two
nooses were found hanging from the same tree the next day. During the fall, racial tensions
rose and fights erupted between black and white students. In December, a group of black
students attacked a white male, badly beating him. Those students were prosecuted, and
one was convicted by an all-white jury. Civil rights advocates protested the disparate
outcome in which black students were criminally prosecuted while the previous racial
incidents-including the noose-hanging-were ignored. Id. at 1288-91.
62. Al Sharpton Pleads for Tougher Hate Crimes Law in Wake of Jena 6 Arrests,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 16, 2007. See also Plan to Strengthen Civil Rights, http://www.
barackobama.com/issues/civil-rights/#hate-crimes (last visited July 7, 2009) (calling for
stronger hate crime legislation).
63. Jena 6 and the Role of Federal Intervention in Hate Crimes and Race-Related
Violence in Public Schools. Hearing Before the H Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong.
(2007) (statement of Al Sharpton, President, National Action Network) ("I've seen where
people that have been involved in drug trafficking has gotten around those laws by using
kids. Are we now going to have a society where if you want to hang up a noose or paint a
swastika, you use somebody underage to do it?").
64. Rally Urges Hate Crimes Prosecutions, New AG Responds, CNN.COM, Nov. 16,
2007, http://www.cnn.com/2OO7/POLITICS/11/16/justice.rally/index.html.
65. Interview with Seema Ahmad, Candidate for J.D., Georgetown Univ. L. Ctr., in
Wash., D.C. (Oct. 18, 2007).
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III. PRISON CONDITIONS AND PRISONER ABUSE
Prison conditions matter. This might seem so obvious as to be banal,
but I don't think so. American lawyers have overwhelmingly focused their
attention on the time from initial suspicion to final judgment and have
developed an extensive jurisprudence governing these stages of the
process. Indeed, this period is what most are thinking of when they laud
the protections built into the American criminal system-this is the
Cadillac of which Katyal speaks. But how we treat both incarcerated
suspects while they await trial and convicts after judgment has received
much less notice.' While it is the subject of substantial academic debate, it
is ignored in the criminal and constitutional curricula of our law schools67
and is unfamiliar even to many American criminal lawyers.
Those awaiting trial or serving sentences see the world quite differently.
The disjuncture between what the lawyer and the client think matter is often
made manifest at the lawyer's first meeting with an incarcerated client
whose case is pending appeal. I will never forget my first such visit, arriving
at Lorton Prison in Virginia, armed with the trial transcript, preparing to
discuss what claims might be pressed upon the appellate court. My client
interrupted me a few minutes into the discussion to say, "Mr. Forman, I hear
that, but I need to be moved to a different unit. I'm in here with all these
young dudes, and they are too wild." He went on to describe the violence of
the place, the stabbings, shankings, and general mayhem caused by inmates
and guards alike. He was serving a long sentence, and his main goal was to
get to a part of the facility with older, and to his mind calmer, fellow lifers.
My thoughts about his legal claims could wait.
Some terror suspects see the world the same way. When Salim
Hamdan finally had his day before a Guantanamo tribunal, after years of
being held without trial, what did he want to discuss with the judge first?
His housing situation.68 He took the stand and described the details of his
66. See Anthony Kennedy, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Speech at the
American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), http://www.supreme
courtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-08-9-03.html [hereinafter Kennedy, A.B.A. Speech]
("When someone has been judged guilty and the appellate and collateral review process
has ended, the legal profession seems to lose all interest."). It was not always so. See, e.g.,
JAMES B. JACOBS, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONS AND IMPRISONMENT 39 (1983) (arguing
that in the 1970s, "[a] platoon, eventually a phalanx, of prisoners' rights lawyers, supported
by federal and foundation funding, soon appeared .... They initiated, and won, prisoners'
rights cases that implicated every aspect of prison governance.").
67. Cases such as Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) (setting standard for Eighth
Amendment challenges to prison conditions) and Hudson v. MeMillan, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)
(setting standard for when use of force by prison guards violates Eighth Amendment), for
example, are hugely important to prison inmates but get little attention in law school.
68. William Glaberson, Detainee Challenges Guantanamo by Describing Life There,
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2008, at A13.
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life to the military commissioners. "Camp Echo is like a graveyard where
you place a dead person in a tomb," he said. At Camp 6 "you can only see
the soldiers. And, of course, I was never able to see the sun." He
complained that the cells were small and that his few permitted
possessions-toothbrush, blanket, and towel-were sometimes seized. His
most serious objection was that he had been placed in Camp 5, which,
revealingly, is among the Guantanamo units that most resemble an
American supermax prison. He had previously been housed in Camp 4,
which he preferred because there detainees could eat and pray together.
According to Hamdan's lawyers, their client could "barely discuss any
subject other than his wish to get back to Camp 4." If they could not get
him out of Camp 5, he told them, "I don't need you. Why are you my
lawyer? "69
Hamdan's plea to get out of the American-style supermax unit
highlights a key feature of the international debate over the war on terror
since September 11, 2001. While human rights lawyers and Europeans
have reacted negatively to severe conditions of confinement
(Guantanamo) and prisoner abuse (Abu Ghraib), Americans have seen it
differently. The conditions of Guantanamo have been largely ignored
domestically. Indeed, when confronted with evidence of harsh conditions
at Guantanamo, the response of some American officials has been to
argue that conditions there are no different from normal American
prisons."0 Rather than shrink from our domestic harshness, we have come
to embrace it. Even the prisoner abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib followed a
traditional pattern-a burst of outrage and eventual punishment of low-
level officials, followed by a return to normalcy. These responses, I
suggest, were predictable, given the harsh criminal justice complex we
have constructed to fight the war on crime. Highly restrictive supermax
facilities and episodic prisoner abuse have become some of the "taken-for-
granted features" of crime policy,7' and no longer scandalize the American
public.
In the section that follows, I separate the discussion of prison
conditions into three categories. First, I discuss supermax facilities
domestically and on Guantanamo Bay, pointing out similarities. Second, I
69. Id
70. See Roundtable with Buzby, supra note 36.
71. GARLAND, supra note 9, at 1. In focusing on prisoner abuse, I do not mean to
minimize the severe constraints under which prison professionals labor. Running a safe,
humane prison is a difficult task that requires, among other things, sufficient resources.
Our nation does not always adequately fund the endeavor, which leads to overcrowding
and makes it difficult to recruit high-quality staff. In this area as in others, we get what we
pay for. For a discussion of these concerns, see James B. Jacobs, Prison Reform Amid the
Ruins of Prisoners'Rights, in THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 179, 179-82 (Michael Tonry
ed., 2004).
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discuss what I call degradation policy-policies or practices in American
prisons that are designed to undermine the dignity of the prisoner. This
category, which focuses on officially sanctioned policy, makes clear that
prison officials have wide berth to develop policies that dehumanize
prisoners. But even with such latitude, some restrictions exist. When
guards cross these lines, we get the third category, which I am calling
episodic abuse by rogue guards.
Amnesty International recently sought to highlight abusive living
conditions at Guantanamo Bay by constructing a mock Guantanamo jail
cell on the National Mall in Washington, D.C.72 Tourists reacted with
shrugs.73 After all, America already has similar cells for 20,000 domestic
prisoners.' 4 In an American supermax prison, cells range from seventy-
seven to eighty-seven square feet. Isolation is the norm. Inmates are
locked in these cells for twenty-two and a half hours a day and are allowed
to exercise in an area about the size of two small cars for the remaining
hour and a half. The walls surrounding this small exercise area are twenty
feet high and the top is covered by a metal grate. No exercise equipment is
allowed. Each inmate is issued a jumpsuit, a t-shirt, boxers, and shorts.
They are typically allowed to have papers and books, and in some prisons
they have TVs on which they may watch prison-approved educational and
religious programs.75 As with all their possessions, these may be taken
away by guards. Prisoners who break any rules are punished and
humiliated in a variety of ways. Those that refuse to eat, for example, may
be fed "food bricks" made up of a nearly inedible combination of all the
day's food.76 Dogs, originally used for drug detection, are now employed
to control inmates. In a training video developed by the Arizona
72. Paul Schwartzman, Activists Offer a Taste of Guantanamo Prison, WASH. POST,
June 26, 2008, at B2.
73. Id.
74. Joseph Petrocelli, All the Bad Apples in One Barrel: Are Supermax Prisons a
Good Idea?, OFFICER.COM, July 8, 2008, http://www.officer.com/web/online/Editorial-
and-Features/All-the-Bad-Apples-in-One-Barrel/19$33048. See also Gawande, supra
note 7, at 39 ("If prolonged isolation is-as research and experience have confirmed for
decades-so objectively horrifying, so intrinsically cruel, how did we end up with a prison
system that may subject more of our own citizens to it than any other country in history
has?"). One response to Gawande's "how did we end up with supermax prisons" question
is offered by James Jacobs, who suggests that "prison reform litigation of the late twentieth
century may have contributed to the emergence of a new form of super-maximum-security
incarceration that scrupulously respects the letter of the law, while constituting a prison
regime remarkable for a new form of inhumanity, marked by massive control and minimal
interpersonal human contact." Jacobs, supra note 71, at 187.
75. See All Things Considered At Pelican Bay Prison, A Life in Solitary, (NPR, radio
broadcast July 26, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyld=5584254 (detailing conditions inside the prison's solitary confinement unit).
76. SASHA ABRAMSKY, HARD TIME BLUES 227 (2002) [hereinafter ABRAMSKY, HARD
TIME BLUES].
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Department of Corrections, officers are taught how to use dogs to drag
inmates out of their cells in a manner that evokes some of the infamous
dog photos from Abu Ghraib.
77
Some of the units at Guantanamo Bay are almost identical in structure
to domestic supermax units, with similar rules consigning prisoners to their
cells for at least twenty-two hours a day.78 The similarity is intentional, as
the military used the precise blueprints from domestic prisons in
constructing the Guantanamo cells. 79 Some restrictions at Guantanamo
are even more severe, such as prohibitions on phone calls and visits.80 As
with inmates in supermax facilities domestically, the few items that
prisoners are allowed to have can be taken away for the slightest
infraction."1 These extreme conditions of isolation can cause several
psychological problems for the inmates" and have been condemned
internationally. s3
This humiliation is not limited to prisoners in supermax facilities:
many American prisoners in other facilities also face degradation on a
regular basis. A few examples: Sheriff Joe Arpaio of Maricopa County,
Arizona, prides himself on housing some of his inmates in tents-outside,
in 120-degree heat.84 He has also publicized the return of the chain gang,
which he employs for drunk drivers, whom he dresses in pink." Sheriff
77. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CRUEL AND DEGRADING: THE USE OF DOGS FOR CELL
EXTRACTIONS IN U.S. PRISONS 6 (2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/usl006webwcover.pdf.
78. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOCKED UP ALONE: DETENTION CONDITIONS AND
MENTAL HEALTH AT GUANTANAMO 8-9 (2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/us06O8-l.pdf.
79. Id at 9, 11.
80. Id. at 14-16.
81. Id. at 17.
82. See id at 3-4 (detailing mental health problems of several Guantanamo
detainees).
83. Mustafa v. United States, 2008 E.W.H.C. 1375, T 70 (Admin.) ("[W]e too are
troubled about what we have read about the conditions in some of the Supermax prisons in
the United States .... [C]onfinement for years and years in what effectively amounts to
isolation may well be held to be, if not torture, then ill treatment which contravenes Article
3 [of the European Convention on Human Rights]."). Atul Gawande argues that
European countries have chosen a different approach to dealing with violent and difficult-
to-control prisoners:
The results have been impressive. The use of long-term isolation in England is now
negligible. In all of England, there are now fewer prisoners in "extreme custody"
than there are in the state of Maine. And the other countries of Europe have, with a
similar focus on small units and violence prevention, achieved a similar outcome.
Gawande, supra note 7, at 44.
84. JOE ARPAIO & LEN SHERMAN, AMERICA'S TOUGHEST SHERIFF: HOW TO WIN THE
WAR AGAINST CRIME 31 (1996).
85. Arizona Sheriff Forms DUI Chain Gang Dressed in Pink, DUI.coM, Dec. 12, 2007,
http://www.dui.com/dui-library/arizona/news/arizona-sheriff-forms-dui-chain-gang-dressed-
in-pink.
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Gerald Hege of Lexington, North Carolina, painted the inside of his jail
bright pink and made a practice of referring to prisoners in his jail-many
of whom had not been convicted of anything-as "scumbags," both to
their faces and when meeting with constituents.86
Some officers go further. In Dooly State Prison in Georgia, a guard
required an inmate to tap dance naked before giving him a body cavity
search.87 Other prisoners were forced to strip naked in front of guards and
inmates, given unnecessary body cavity searches, and forced to display
their genitalia to other inmates.88 At Pelican Bay State Prison in
California, inmates were subjected to the use of fetal restraints, locked in
outdoor cages naked, and chained to toilets. Still others had their skin
peeled off after being bathed in boiling water.89
America has so many jails and prisons, and each one is so large that it
is easy to lose sight of the scope of the abuse. Consider that as recently as
July 2008, a federal investigation concluded that the conditions in
Chicago's Cook County Jail violated the constitutional rights of its
inmates.9° The report detailed numerous instances of physical abuse,
inadequate health care, and unsanitary living conditions.91 Inmates were
beaten by guards for no reason or as punishment for breaking rules.92 One
inmate, after being accused of planting contraband, was beaten by multiple
officers while lying handcuffed on the floor. The guards fractured his jaw,
forcing him to undergo multiple surgeries and eat through a straw.93
The Department of Justice investigation into the Cook County Jail rated
barely one day's story in the press. But to understand the relative scale of this
scandal, consider that the daily population of the jail is approximately 9800
inmates, with nearly 100,000 people passing through yearly.94 This means the
equivalent of the entire prison population of Germany (78,707), England
(72,669), Italy (55,136), Spain (50,656), or France (50,714) has been subjected
to these inhumane conditions each year.95
The temptation is to dismiss instances of prisoner abuse as aberrations.
Though most prisons are run by competent professionals, it would be a
86. ALAN ELSNER, GATES OF INJUSTICE: THE CRISIS IN AMERICA'S PRISONS 2-3 (2004).
87. Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., America'sAbu Ghraibs, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2004, at A17.
88. Id.
89. James D. Maynard, One Case for an Independent Federal Judiciary.- Prison
Reform Litigation Spurs Structural Change in California, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 419, 419-
20 (2006).
90. CIVIL RIGHTS Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COOK COUNTY JAIL 3 (2008).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 10.
93. Id. at 14.
94. Id. at 3.
95. Roy WALMSLEY, HOME OFFICE (U.K.), WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 5 (4th
ed. 2003), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/r188.pdf.
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mistake to minimize the scope of abuse. Similarly, the law plays a role in
allowing the abuse to continue. After all, the trend in our legal system has
been to make it yet more difficult for prisoners to challenge their
conditions of confinement. Solitary confinement in supermax facilities, for
example, has been validated by courts.96 In addition, individual prisoner
suits face additional hurdles since the passage of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA).97 The PLRA states that prisoners may not recover
compensatory damages for "mental or emotional injury suffered while in
custody without a prior showing of physical injury."98 Courts have said
that "physical injury" was not present in cases alleging, among other
things, sexual assault, facial burns, "pain, numbness in extremities, loss of
mobility, lack of sleep," and "severe stomach aches, severe headaches,
severe dehydration ... and blurred vision."99
In addition to assaults by guards, we place prisoners at constant risk of
assault from other prisoners. Sexual assault is a particular problem.' °
While efforts to quantify the scope of the prison rape problem face severe
methodological challenges,1"1 even conservative estimates suggest it is a
significant problem in American prisons. For example, Congressional
findings in connection with the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003
indicate that approximately thirteen percent of inmates have been sexually
assaulted in prison. 2 By this estimate, in the last twenty years over one
million prisoners have been raped in United States facilities.1"3 Some
populations are especially vulnerable, including first-time offenders, the
young, and the mentally ill.04  Although the prison rape problem has
received increased attention in the last decade, it still remains a source of
96. For a discussion of judicial reactions to solitary confinement, see Gawande, supra
note 7, at 41-42 and COLIN DAYAN, THE STORY OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 43-46, 54-57
(2007). For additional discussions of the harms imposed by solitary confinement, see
generally LORNA AMARASINGHAM RHODES, TOTAL CONFINEMENT: MADNESS AND REASON
IN THE MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON (2004); Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating
Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 477 (1997).
97. Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-10, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66-77 (1996) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C.§ 523 (2006), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624, 3626 (2006), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1915,
1915A (2006), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-1997h (2006)).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2006).
99. For a summary and analysis of cases, see Margo Schianger & Giovanna Shay,
Preserving the Rule of Law in America's Jails and Prisons: The Case for Amending the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 J. CON. L. 1, 4-8 (2008).
100. STOP PRISONER RAPE, IN THE SHADOWS: SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN U.S. DETENTION
FACILITIES, A SHADOW REPORT TO THE U.N. COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE 3 (2006),
available at http://www.justdetention.org/pdf/in the-shadows.pdf.
101. Mary Sigler, By the Light of Virtue: Prison Rape and the Corruption of
Character, 91 IOWA L. REV. 561, 569-70 (2006).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 15601(2) (2004).
103. Id.
104. § 15601(3)-(4).
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humor for some. For example, speaking about former Enron Chairman
Kenneth Lay, California Attorney General Bill Lockyer joked in 2001 that
he would "love to personally escort Lay to an eight-by-ten cell that he
could share with a tattooed dude who says, 'Hi, my name is Spike,
honey.'°
10 5
Our domestic prison guards are trained and socialized in these harsh
environments, and they sometimes export brutal tactics to the world via the
war on terror. The harshness also circles back to the United States domestic
system, as prison officials increasingly recruit former military veterans to serve
as prison guards.1"6 The story of Charles Graner highlights this dynamic.
Graner achieved infamy as the ringleader of the abuse at Abu Ghraib and was
sentenced to ten years in prison for his role.1"7 But before Graner got to Abu
Ghraib, he was a domestic prison guard and a Marine. Graner served in the
Marine Forces Reserve in the 1980s and early 1990s; upon returning home
from a tour in Saudi Arabia, he sought employment in southwestern
Pennsylvania.1"8 He was ultimately hired as a prison guard at the maximum-
security State Correctional Institute-Greene (SCI Greene), where he
benefited from a program that gave preference to former military officers
seeking prison guard positions. 9 In 1998, SCI Greene was rocked by a
massive prisoner abuse scandal that led to changes in the prison
administration and the firing of some guards.11 Graner was not fired,
105. Editorial, Investigating Enron, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2001, at A14. Prison rape
jokes also feature prominently in popular culture. I remember my disgust some years ago
when watching a 7UP ad making light of sexual assault. Mary Sigler describes the ad:
Meanwhile, a recent advertising campaign for a popular soft drink featured the
company's pitch man, the comedian Godfrey, distributing cans of soda in a prison.
When he drops a can, he starts to bend over to pick it up, but quickly stops himself,
saying, "Im not picking that up." The commercial ends with Godfrey seated in a cell
next to a large, tattooed inmate whose arm is draped around him. When Godfrey
delivers the company's tag line-"When you drink 7UP, everyone is your friend"-
the inmate tightens his hold, to Godfrey's obvious discomfort.
Sigler, supra note 101, at 563. As Sigler points out, the ad is especially disconcerting, "for it
is based on the market-tested assumption that prison rape is an appropriate subject of
humor and that the joke will not be lost on viewers." Id.
106. Matthew Pavelek, Corrections Industry Offers Steady Growth and Stable
Employment Opportunities, GIJOBS.NET, Sept. 2008, http://www.gijobs.net/magazine.
cfm?id=1085&issueld=85. In the Federal Bureau of Prisons, for example, nearly a quarter
of the corrections officers are veterans. Id. Nashville-based Corrections Corporation of
America-the nation's largest for-profit prison operator-was recently rated one of the
"Top 50 Military-Friendly Employers," by 6.. Jobs magazine. Id.
107. Kate Zernike, Reservist Gets 10 Years for Abuses at Abu Ghraib, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Jan. 17, 2005, at 6.
108. David Finkel & Christian Davenport, Records Paint Dark Portrait of Guard,
WASH. POST, June 5, 2004, at Al.
109. SASHA ABRAMSKY, AMERICAN FURIES: CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND VENGEANCE IN
THE AGE OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 4 (2007) [hereinafter ABRAMSKY, AMERICAN FURIES].
110. Mike Bucsko & Bob Dvorchak, Firings, Charges Shake Up SCI Greene,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 9, 1998, at Al. The allegations at Greene included
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however, and when the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan began, he joined the
Army Reserves and was called up."' He was eventually put in charge of
guarding prisoners at Abu Ghraib as well, and his abuse of that power led
ultimately to his downfall and eventual conviction.
Reports of prisoner abuse during the prosecution of the war on terror
must be understood against the backdrop of this constant drumbeat of
domestic prisoner abuse stories. We have allowed this sort of degradation
and humiliation to become normal, acceptable, even inevitable. It has
become the cost of doing business, a necessary incident to running such a
large prison system full of incorrigibles. As investigative journalist Sasha
Abramsky found when he talked to the residents of the Pennsylvania town
that is home to SCI Greene, even an enormous prison scandal involving
allegations of ritual abuse by guards had little impact on the area's free
population.11 2 "I do not remember people talking about it, no," county
commissioner Pamela Synder told Abramsky. "The concerns here are the
concerns that truly affect people's daily lives: it's jobs, it's health care, it's
quality of life." '113
Not only is prison abuse familiar to Americans, so is the rhetoric
justifying it. In the war on terror, as in the war on crime, a common tactic
is to label the victims as deserving of abuse. When the first individuals
arrived at Guantanamo, before one person had been tried, former
President Bush defended our treatment of them on the grounds that they
were "killers," and later proclaimed, "[t]he only thing I know for certain is
that these are bad people .... , 114 Former Vice President Cheney said they
were "the worst of a very bad lot" who were "devoted to killing millions of
Americans. 1 15 After the Abu Ghraib photos were released, Oklahoma
Republican James Inhofe said he was "more outraged by the outrage
than ... by the treatment" of the detainees." 6 Despite reports that up to
ninety percent of those detained in Iraq were there by mistake, 7 Inhofe
argued that the Abu Ghraib prisoners were "not there for traffic
charges that guards were told to "work over" inmates who needed "attitude adjustments"
by, among other things, beating their heads against the wall. ld.
111. Finkel & Davenport, supra note 108.
112. Id. at 3 (reporting that Waynesburg "greeted the allegations with stony silence").
113. Id. at 4.
114. David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantanamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981,
2015 (2008) [hereinafter Luban, Lawfare]; Bush-Blair News Conference (CNN television
broadcast July 17, 2003).
115. Fox News Sunday: Cheney on Guantanamo Detainees (Fox News television
broadcast Jan. 27, 2002).
116. GOP Senator Labels Abused Prisoners 'Terrorists,' CNN.cOM, May 12, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/O5/11/inhofe.abuse/.
117. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT ON THE TREATMENT BY THE COALITION
FORCES OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND OTHER PROTECTED PERSONS BY THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS IN IRAQ DURING ARREST, INTERNMENT AND INTERROGATION 8 (2004), available
athttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ibrary/report/2004/icrc-repDort-iraq-feb2004.pdf.
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violations.... If they're in Cell Block 1-A or 1-B, these prisoners-they're
murderers, they're terrorists, they're insurgents. Many of them probably
have American blood on their hands. And here we're so concerned about
the treatment of those individuals.'
1 8
This tactic has roots in our domestic war on crime, where popular law
enforcement officers defend harsh prison conditions on the grounds that
the inmates are "killers" and "the worst of the worst.""' 9 As Sheriff
Arpaio writes in America's Toughest Sheriff How to Win the War Against
Crime, "The reality is stark-either the good guys will prevail and restore
some sense of decency and honor and respect to our society, or the bad
guys will come out on top and destroy everything we hold dear.... Win or
lose. Right or wrong. Good guys versus bad guys. Sometimes life is that
straightforward."12 °
Arpaio uses language mirroring that of Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld.
But Arpaio's play is even more audacious. He is running a jail, which
means it houses two categories of prisoners: those who are awaiting trial
and therefore should be presumed innocent, and those serving less than
one-year sentences. Prisoners serving longer than one-year sentences are
held in state-run prisons, rather than county jails. So those left in Arpaio's
jail are serving time for fraud, forgery, drug possession, theft and assault-
not the hardened killers and rapists he invokes to justify this sort of
degradation.'21 That said, if an American sheriff can sell voters on the
value of degrading domestic criminals by disposing of the presumption of
innocence, there is every reason to think the Bush administration could
and would succeed with a similar tactic in the fearful months after
September 11.
IV. HARSH TREATMENT OF JUVENILES
Much of the world was shocked to learn juveniles were being held in
Guantanamo Bay. 22 The United States recently reported to the U.N.
Committee on the Rights of the Child that it has detained approximately
2500 juveniles in Guantanamo Bay, Iraq, and Afghanistan since 2002.123 In
118. GOP Senator Labels Abused Prisoners 'Terrorists, 'supra note 116.
119. ABRAMSKY, AMERICAN FURIES, supra note 109, at 82.
120. ARPAIO & SHERMAN, supra note 84, at xxi-xxii.
121. ABRAMSKY, AMERICAN FURIES, supra note 109, at 82.
122. See, e.g., Oliver Burkeman, Children Held at Guantanamo Bay, GUARDIAN, Apr.
24, 2003, at 1, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/apr/24/usa.afghanistan;
Maggie Farley, Guantanamo Inmate Stirs Debate in Canada, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 24, 2007, at
A3 (telling the story of Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen accused of terrorism, who was
fifteen years old when he was first sent to Guantanamo).
123. U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Written Replies by the Government
of the United States of America Concerning the List of Issues (CRCIC/OPA C/USA/Q/1) to be
Taken up in Connection with the Consideration of the Initial Report of the United States of
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the United States, this revelation caused barely a stir. Indeed, the
government argued that age was not relevant. According to Lt. Col.
Matthew P. Beevers, chief spokesman for the United States military in
Afghanistan, "[a]ge is not a determining factor in detention.', 124  This
reaction should not surprise us; after all, Americans have become
accustomed to exposing juveniles to the full harshness of our adult penal
system. One example of how much of an outlier we are in this regard:
worldwide there are 2237 people serving life sentences without parole for
crimes they committed as juveniles. All but twelve of them are in the
U.S.125
Similarly, until the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional,126 the
United States was one of only six nations in the world to authorize the
death penalty for juveniles (the others are Iran, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, and Yemen).12 v Before this ruling legislators in some states had
proposed the death penalty for offenders as young as eleven,128 and
children as young as thirteen are among those serving the life without
parole sentences described above. 29
Even juveniles who remain in juvenile facilities rather than prisons
often do not escape the brutal treatment described in the previous section.
The juvenile justice system's original mandates of care and rehabilitation
have frequently been replaced, in policy or practice, by a punitive
emphasis. 3 ° In Florida, for example, a fourteen-year-old boy was admitted
into a state-run boot camp after stealing his grandmother's car. Shortly
America under Article 8, Paragraph 1 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights
of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (CRC/C/OPA C/USA/i), $ 28,
U.N. Doc. CRC/C/OPAC/USA/Q/1/Add.1/Rev.1 (June 2, 2008), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4885cfb2.html.
124. Carlotta Gall, 3 Afghan Youths Question US. Captivity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2005, at A10.
125. John Hubner, Discarded Lives: Children Sentenced to Life Without Parole,
AMNESTY INT'L. MAG., Spring 2006, at 16, 17, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/
Spring_2006/Discarded LivesChildrenSentenced to LifeWithoutParole/page.do?id=l
105357&nl=2&n2=19&n3=392. By another account, all juveniles serving life without
parole sentences worldwide are in the United States. Connie de la Vega & Michelle
Leighton, Sentencing Our Children to Die in Prison: Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F. L.
REV. 983, 990 (2008). For a detailed look at the practice in one state, see HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, "WHEN I DIE, THEY'LL SEND ME HOME:" YOUTH SENTENCED TO LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA (2008), available at http://www.hrw. org/en/node/75357/section/l.
126. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2004).
127. P. EL1KANN, SUPERPREDATORS: THE DEMONIZATION OF OUR CHILDREN BY THE
LAW 151 (1999).
128. Id. at 152.
129. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14-
YEAR-OLD CHILDREN TO DIE IN PRISON 3 (2008), available at http://www.eji.org/eji/
files/20071017cruelandunusual.pdf.
130. For an exhaustive account of conditions of confinement in juvenile facilities, see
Douglas E. Abrams, Reforming Juvenile Delinquency to Enhance Rehabilitation, Personal
Accountability, and Public Safety, 84 OR. L. REV. 1001 (2005).
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after his arrival, he fell down complaining of shortness of breath during a
forced run around the boot camp's track. In response, more than seven
guards descended upon him and roughed him up as he lay helpless on the
ground. Eventually the boy was taken to the hospital, where he died the
next day.131 In Texas, in the past few years, youths in state custody were
sexually molested by state employees, while officials kept the reports
secret.13 In Louisiana, guards created a game they called "Friday Night
Fights" -placing some of the more aggressive youths into rooms with
known rivals-entertaining themselves by watching the kids pummel each
other.
1 33
We justify such harshness toward juvenile offenders with the oft-heard
slogan, "Do adult crime, do adult time."'34 When we hear this phrase, we
typically think of things such as long prison sentences. But politicians
sometimes invoke the violent conditions that mark our adult corrections
system and argue that youthful offenders should be subjected to them as
well. This is what California Governor Pete Wilson had in mind when he
said that teenagers convicted of serious crimes should "experience the
terror that can only come from being locked in a real prison
environment.,
135
Echoing the arguments made in the context of the war on crime,
defenders of holding juveniles in the war on terror argue that the teens
have committed adult-like crimes and should be treated accordingly. As
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said when asked about juveniles
in Guantanamo, "They may be juveniles but they're not on a Little League
team anywhere. They're on a Major League team, and it's a terrorist
team." '136 This same reasoning seems to have been the dominant response
to Omar Khadr's interrogation video released recently by his lawyers.
Khadr was sixteen when he was interrogated at Guantanamo, and his
lawyers have made clear their hope that the circumstances of his
interrogation (which include his age, intense questioning, pleading and
crying by Khadr, and references to previous physical abuse) will gain
131. Carol Marbin Miller, Boot Camp Death: Guards Detail Youth's Final Minutes,
MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 10, 2006, at Al. The guards were acquitted of manslaughter charges
by a jury. Melissa Nelson, Guards Acquitted in Boot Camp Case, USA TODAY, Oct. 12,
2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-10-11-3868327840_x.htm.
132. Sylvia Moreno, In Texas, Scandal Rocks Juvenile Justice System, WASH. POST,
Apr. 5, 2007, at A3; R.G. Ratcliffe, Crisis Was Years in Making, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar.
11, 2007, at Al.
133. Mark Gladstone & James Rainey, Abuse Reports Cloud Youth Authority, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 1999, at Al.
134. E.g., Linda J. Collier, Adult Crime, Adult Time.- Outdated Juvenile Laws Thwart
Justice, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1998, at Cl.
135. ABRAMSKY, HARD TIME BLUES, supra note 76, at 220.
136. Ted Conover, In the Land of Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2003
(Magazine), at 40.
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public sympathy. One of Khadr's lawyers, Nathan Whitling, said he was
"pleading in the court of public opinion.' 1 37
Perhaps the video will have an impact in Canada, where Khadr is a
citizen, and the Canadian government might in turn pressure the U.S.
government.13 s But in America, where intense interrogations of juveniles
are the norm, teenage status has long failed to move a public accustomed
to treating teenage suspects as adults. In place of sympathy, our likely
national impulse is summed up by the retired Special Forces soldier who
told the Washington Post, "That's not just a sixteen-year-old boy snapped
up off the streets. This is a demonstrated, hardened killer who is not
happy with his new perspective on life, which is that he's going to be
spending a long, long time in U.S. custody.
'139
V. THE DECLINE OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
Since the war on crime's launch in the early 1970s, judges have come
under sustained attack as insufficiently committed to the contest.14° The
critiques have taken a variety of forms. Judges have been criticized as
arbitrary, irrational, idiosyncratic, elitist, and susceptible to being duped by
clever defense lawyers or sympathetic defendants.' They have been
charged with spinning a "procedural web" designed "to prevent criminals
from falling into the maw of the prison system." '142 At the heart of this web
is the exclusionary rule, which allows criminals to go free when judges find
that police have violated the Constitution in gathering evidence. 4 3 Even
when defendants are found guilty, critics say, judges too often impose light
sentences that fail to protect the community.' Florida Senator Paula
Hawkins put the point plainly during debates over drug crime legislation in
137. Ian Austen, Blurry Peek at Questioning of a Guantanamo Inmate, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2008, at A10.
138. Cf WHITMAN, supra note 52, at 45 (describing how movement in American
criminal justice to treat juveniles as adults "contrasts strongly with both German and
French practice, and the European press has seized on the shift in American criminal
justice with a mix of horror and journalistic fascination").
139. Jerry Markon & Josh White, Detainee Describes Treatment, WASH. POST, July
16, 2008, at A6.
140. JONATHON SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 127 (2007).
141. E.g., id. at 128.
142. MAx BOOT, OUT OF ORDER: ARROGANCE, CORRUPTION, AND INCOMPETENCE ON
THE BENCH 65 (1998).
143. Id
144. See id. at 50-52 (arguing that judges often fail to "take [the] simple step" of
keeping repeat criminals off the streets). See also Phil Gramm, Drugs, Crime &
Punishment, Don't Let Judges Set Crooks Free, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1993, at A19 ("Given
this extremely low rate of expected punishment, is it any wonder that our nation is deluged
by a tidal wave of crime?").
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the 1980s: "[A]1 too many of our judges still avail themselves of the wide
sentencing discretion allowed them under these watered down laws to let
major drug dealers off with a tap on the wrist even after conviction." '145
The appeals process is even worse, say the critics, as the court system
allows litigious defendants to delay the inevitable, wasting precious
resources and denying finality to victims.
14 6
Attacking judges as unduly sympathetic to criminals started on the
right side of the political spectrum but became more wide-spread over
time. Bill Clinton's tough-on-crime strategy included appointing an
overwhelming number of former federal prosecutors as judges, avoiding
controversial appointments, and, in one instance, criticizing his own
appointee for excluding evidence in a drug case. 47 More recently, Barack
Obama, as a presidential candidate, criticized the Supreme Court for
ruling that the death penalty could not apply to child rape cases. 4 The
drumbeat of criticism has one consistent theme: judges cannot be counted
on to protect us from society's thugs. Judges are "behind each of the most
perverse failures of today's justice system," argues political scientist John
Dilulio, and innocent, law-abiding citizens pay the price.'49
Consistent with this criticism, over the past forty years legislatures
have steadily reduced judges' authority in criminal cases. Congress has cut
back on habeas corpus review by limiting prisoners' ability to challenge
their convictions and conditions of confinement.150 Judges have also lost
sentencing authority. In 1980, there were only two states with sentencing
guidelines; by 2000, there were seventeen."' In 1980, there were no state-
level three-strikes laws, requiring life sentences for certain categories of
repeat offenders; by 2000, twenty-four states and the federal government
145. 132 CONG. REC. 17918 (July 29, 1986) (statement of Sen. Hawkins).
146. "Comprehensive reform of the habeas corpus rules prevent convicted criminals
from exploiting the system, with more frivolous appeals, more unnecessary delays, and yes,
more grief for the victims of crime and their families." 141 CONG. REC. S2678 (daily ed.
Feb. 15, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
147. Linda Greenhouse, Judges as Political Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1996, at Al.
148. James Oliphant, Death Penalty for Child Rape Banned, L.A. TIMES, June 26,
2008, at A19.
149. John J. Difulio Jr., Rule of Law: A Philadelphia Crime Story, WALL ST. J., Oct.
26, 1994, at A21.
150. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). For an excellent
discussion of the AEDPA, see James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2043-45 (2000). Liebman questions the necessity of the legislation
pointing out that "by all objective accounts-e.g., that of Chief Judge Richard Posner-
noncapital habeas and section 2255 procedures were working well by the early 1990s, with
per capital filings down by two-thirds since 1970." Id at 2044.
151. WESTERN, supra note 49, at 65. See also GARLAND, supra note 9, at 58-61
(discussing broad array of intellectual and political forces supporting rise of determinate
sentencing); Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 741-46
(2005) (tracing movement supporting growth of sentencing commissions).
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had such laws. 5 2  During the same time period mandatory minimum
sentences for many categories of crime proliferated around the country,
and the majority of states moved to abolish or limit parole.'53
The George W. Bush administration was particularly suspicious of
judges. The administration pushed for the "Feeney Amendment," which
further limited judges' already constrained ability to reduce sentences
below the Federal Guidelines' range.154  This amendment required
Attorney General John Ashcroft to report any judicial departures below
the range set by the Guidelines to the Judiciary Committees of both
Houses of Congress. This amendment was widely criticized, including by
former Chief Justice William Rehnquist.
155
As these examples make clear, in the war on crime the legislative and
executive branches moved jointly to expand their own authority at the
expense of the judiciary. Sometimes the seizure was direct. By enacting
mandatory minimums, for example, the other branches determined what
the minimum sentence would be for particular crimes, taking away a
judge's ability to decide based on the specifics of the case. Other times the
power shifted indirectly. Prosecutors have gained tremendous additional
power from sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums because they
can use these guidelines to set the terms of the entire case based on what
charges to file and whether and how to plea bargain.
156
Judges from across the political spectrum have spoken out against
these changes,15 ' but to little avail. For critics, these judges' own excessive
leniency explains why they lost authority. As Max Boot argues, "[t]he
152. WESTERN, supra note 49, at 64-65 (discussing states' three-strikes laws); R. Daniel
O'Connor, Defining the Strike Zone-An Analysis of the Classification of Prior
Convictions under the Federal "Three-Strikes and You're Out" Scheme, 36 B.C. L. REV.
847, 847 (1995) (discussing the federal three-strikes law).
153. Id.
154. MAUER, supra note 43, at 89. The Feeney Amendment required appeals courts to
review downward departures by trial judges. It also established a system for reporting to
Congress the sentencing practices of individual federal judges. Dan Christensen, The Short
Life of the Feeney Amendment, LAW.COM DAILY Bus. REV., Jan. 24, 2005,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1105968948840. Two years after passing Congress,
the Amendment was struck down when the Supreme Court held that the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines were advisory. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005)
("In light of today's holding [that the Guidelines are advisory], the reasoning for these
revisions-to make the Guidelines even more mandatory than it had been-have ceased to
be relevant.").
155. Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Attacks a Law as Infringing on Judges, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2004, at A14.
156. David Margolick, Justice by the Numbers.- Full Spectrum of Judicial Critics Assail
Prison Sentencing Guides, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992, at Al. As a former prosecutor
explained, "[t]he Guidelines make the U.S. attorney the most powerful person in the
courthouse." DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL UNDER LAW: RACE IN THE WAR ON
DRUGS 124 (2007).
157. Margolick, supra note 156.
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common complaint is that the guidelines, especially mandatory minimums,
take away judges' discretion and turn them into sentencing cyborgs.
Precisely. That's the point. And it's worked."'
This is the backdrop for the Bush administration's decisions about
how to handle those captured in the war on terror. The first moves to limit
judicial authority came from the executive branch, in the form of President
Bush's November 13, 2001, order establishing that military commissions,
not civilian courts, would handle the trials of alleged terrorists and that the
defendants would not have access to the writ of habeas corpus.'59 After
the Supreme Court held that the executive could not do this on its own, the
administration was forced to seek legislative approval. This proved easy.16 °
Congress validated the limitation on judicial power by passing the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, which set rules for the military commissions
system and prevented domestic courts from reviewing the commission
rulings. 6 '
Some of the arguments for restricting access to federal courts for
alleged terrorists were specific to that context, including concerns that
domestic courts were not equipped to handle national security secrets. 62
Others built directly off of the critiques advanced in the war on crime. If
judges cannot be trusted to limit grandstanding defense attorneys and a
sensationalist media in high-profile domestic criminal cases, said critics,
"the excesses of the modern U.S. criminal justice system" will ensure that a
major terrorist trial will inevitably turn into a "circus." '16 3 Opponents of
federal court involvement in terrorism trials made a similar point about the
procedural safeguards of our criminal justice system. Allowing judicial
application of such evidentiary and procedural safeguards in terrorism
trials, they said, would mean that "the killer who goes free will later
detonate a 'suitcase' nuclear weapon in mid-Manhattan or L.A."'' As for
habeas corpus, to authorize it for terrorists would subject the federal
courts to the same parade of horribles invoked to justify limiting access in
158. BOOT, supra note 142, at 53.
159. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
160. As Laura Donohue points out, Congress was complicit in the Bush
administration's claims for expanded authority at the expense of the other two branches.
DONOHUE, supra note 33, at 112. Congress "did not pass a single law between 2001 and
2005 that limited or even regulated the executive branch in the exercise of the detention
and interrogation program." Id.
161. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). In
2008, the Supreme Court held that the Military Commissions Act was an unconstitutional
suspension of the detainees' right to habeas corpus. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229,
2277 (2008).
162. Terrorists on Trial, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2001, at A12.
163. Id.
164. Spencer J. Crona & Neal A. Richardson, Commentary, Civilian Courts Give
Terrorists Far Too Many Loopholes, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2002, at M5.
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the domestic context. Prisoners, they argued, would abuse the system by
filing frivolous claims. Using language similar to that employed when
Congress restricted domestic prisoner's access to the courts,'65 South
Carolina Senator Lindsey Graham argued that Guantanamo detainees
have used the habeas writ to "sue[] our own military for everything
imaginable: the quality of the food, DVD access, not enough exercise,
judge-supervised interrogation.""
In sum, the groundwork for limiting judicial authority in the war on
terror was laid by forty years of criticizing judges' role in the war on crime.
As Jonathan Simon writes, today "the judge remains a figure of suspicion, a
person with a propensity to violate public safety.""16 This suspicion of judges
as unwilling or unable to protect Americans from harm found its fullest
expression in the context of the war on terror, where the stakes are so high.
VI. UNDERMINING DEFENSE COUNSEL
Guantanamo defense attorney Clive Stafford Smith has described the
obstacles the government placed in the way of defense lawyers in terrorism
cases. Initially the administration outright denied counsel to terror
suspects;"' more recently, the military has employed a range of tactics to
prevent defense lawyers from doing their jobs, from the mundane (limiting
a lawyer's ability to meet with her client) to the more inventive (telling
Guantanamo prisoners that their lawyers are Jewish, defenders of Israel,
or homosexual, or even sending in interrogators who pretend to be
lawyers).'69 Lawyers representing those locked up in the war on terror
have been accused of waging "lawfare": "the growing use of international
law claims, usually factually or legally meritless, as a tool of war.... to gain
a moral advantage over your enemy in the court of world opinion.""17
As I reflect on such blatant attacks on the right to counsel, I am reminded
of the first criminal case I ever worked on. The summer after graduating law
school, I assisted an experienced death penalty lawyer on a habeas case. Our
client had been charged, more than a decade earlier, with murder in the
165. Senator Orrin Hatch argued that domestic habeas legislation was needed to "stop
the frivolous appeals that have been driving people nuts throughout this country and
subjecting victims and families of victims to unnecessary pain for year after year after year."
141 CONG. REC. S7479 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
166. 153 CONG. REC. S2767 (daily ed. Mar. 7,2007) (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham).
167. SIMON, supra note 140, at 129.
168. Luban, Lawfare, supra note 114, at 1988.
169. CLIVE STAFFORD SMITH, EIGHT O'CLOCK FERRY TO THE WINDWARD SIDE:
SEEKING JUSTICE IN GUANTANAMO BAY 11-12 (2007); Luban, Lawfare, supra note 114, at
1989-92, 1994-95.
170. David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Lawfare, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2007, at All
(emphasis added).
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course of a robbery of a Utah electronics store. The local judge decided to
appoint as the defense attorney a young man who had just graduated from
law school and had never tried a criminal case. Perhaps our client would have
been convicted and sentenced to death anyway, but his fate was surely sealed
when, in one of the most complicated types of cases known to our criminal
law, he was given a lawyer who had never filed a single criminal motion.
Our client's situation was more typical than I knew at the time.171 Since
about three-quarters of felony defendants are poor enough to receive a
state-funded lawyer,172 criminal defense for the poor is, for practical
purposes, American criminal defense.173 And while it is rare to see the type
of government interference that Smith and others describe at Guantanamo,
the state has devised other methods to ensure criminal defendants receive a
lawyer in name only. The principal one is to limit funding available to
contract attorneys and public defender offices.174 On the whole, England
spends three times as much per capita as does the United States on its
indigent defense system."5 In individual states the situation is often far
worse. In Illinois, for example, lawyers can bill only $150 for a misdemeanor
case and $1250 for a felony, and that statute has not changed for a quarter of
a century.176 Most of the people on Alabama's death row were represented
171. Liebman, supra note 150, at 2102-06 (describing in detail cases in which death
penalty defendants are represented by lawyers who are "young and inexperienced, patently
unqualified and incompetent, unethical, or bar-disciplined; sometimes drug-impaired,
drunken, comatose, psychotic, or senile, very often grossly negligent; and nearly always out-
gunned .. "); David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729,
1754 (1993) [hereinafter Luban, Criminal Defenders] ("[T]he vast majority of criminal
defendants receive no individualized scrutiny of their cases but instead are processed like
carcasses at the meat-packing plant.").
172. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 11 (2004).
173. Of course, this is not the entire picture. Defendants who can afford robust
representation are able to mitigate at least some of the harshness of the American criminal
system. See Luban, Criminal Defenders, supra note 171, at 1763 ("[F]or there are in reality two
criminal justice systems, two criminal populations, and two criminal defense bars."). For this
class of the accused, the robust procedural protections built into our system are real. This may in
part explain the continued perception-despite substantial evidence to the contrary-that our
justice system "tilt[s] toward restraint over aggression." LICHTBLAU, supra note 5, at 24.
174. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 32-35 (1997) (arguing that underfunding means public
defense lawyers "fail[] to contest cases as aggressively as they should"). See also Stephen J.
Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: Promoting Effective
Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for All Criminal
Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 93-95 (1993) (arguing that low fees available to
public defense lawyers "provide inducements for sufficient but not excessive effort");
Luban, Criminal Defenders, supra note 171, at 1757 ("Along with this low pay scale goes
the natural human tendency to cut corners, especially when doing unpleasant things on
behalf of unappetizing strangers whom one will probably never see again.").
175. AM. BAR ASS'N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
GIDEON'SBROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 8 (2004)
[hereinafter GIDEON'SBROKEN PROMISE].
176. Id. at 9.
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by lawyers whose fees were capped by statute at $1000.177 A New Orleans
public defender reported defending more than 400 clients in the first seven
months of the year, during which time he pled more than 130 clients at
arraignment and had a serious felony case scheduled for trial every single
available day. 78 As a result of similar stories, the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that lawyers in New Orleans were to be presumed ineffective.'79
The results of underfunding are predictable: states and counties cannot
hire enough competent lawyers and cannot train or supervise those they do.
Attorneys do not have resources to hire investigators or experts, and because
of the crushing caseloads, do not have time to investigate cases themselves.
At the extreme, some clients plead guilty without ever meeting their attorney.
An American Bar Association report found over 12,000 defendants had pled
guilty to misdemeanor charges in Riverside County, California, without
having consulted a lawyer.18° In a Louisiana parish, the public defender had
never met over eighty percent of his clients outside of court. 1 ' Indeed, the
fact that many poor defendants do not have lawyers is one of the reasons for
the high rate of guilty pleas.'82 Nothing concentrates the mind around the
benefits of a guilty plea like hearing the prosecutor answer "ready for trial"
when the judge calls your case and looking over to realize that your lawyer
has never met you and barely knows your name.
Even when a state does make an effort to find and correct its
shortcomings, reform efforts can be short lived. For example, in 2003,
when Georgia noted systematic flaws in its inconsistent and under-funded
indigent defense systems, it passed legislation to create a state-wide public
defender office. The effort was praised by the American Bar Association,
and, surprisingly, the office was created, funded, and moderately effective.
The success was short-lived; less than a year later the Public Defenders'
Office was under attack from an unsympathetic legislature, which began
cutting its budget. The future of the office is now in doubt."3
177. Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to
Collateral Review of Crininal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 343 (2006). In 2000,
Alabama removed the statutory cap for capital cases. Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of
Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE (forthcoming) (manuscript at 8
n.38, on file with New York University Review of Law & Social Change).
178. Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal
Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty are at Stake, 1997 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
783, 816.
179. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 783 (La. 1993). For a review of structural litigation
challenging indigent defense funding, see Drinan, supra note 177.
180. GiDEON'SBROKEN PROMISE, supra note 175, at 26.
181. Id. at 16.
182. RHODE, supra note 172, at 4. Approximately ninety percent of criminal cases are
resolved with guilty pleas. Id.
183. See, e.g., Mary Lou Pickel, Bill Would Strip Public Defender Board of Its
Authority, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 19, 2009, available at http://www.ajc.com/metro/
content/metro/stories/2009/O2/19/georgia-legislature-publicdefender.html.
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The inadequacies I have sketched are now well known.184 Reams of
reports have been issued.18 Books have been written. Highly publicized
stories of defendants being sentenced to death while their attorneys
literally slept in court have circulated. 8 6 The image of the overwhelmed
public defender who wants to plead out the client she hardly knows is well
known. The Supreme Court has left the field largely unregulated,
intervening only rarely in cases of extreme lawyer incompetence. 187 It
would seem that our ambivalence toward defense counsel has become part
of our culture, and we meet stories of marginal lawyering with a collective
shrug.
At best a shrug. The last piece of the story about how we view defense
counsel in the war on terror and the war on crime concerns the aggressive
anti-defense lawyer rhetoric which has come to mark our culture. During
the 1990s, federal funding for capital defense lawyers was largely
eliminated.'88 Individual defense attorneys have faced attack for their
work as well. In the 2005 Virginia gubernatorial race, candidate Tim
Kaine faced attack ads for his work as a defense attorney earlier in his
184. DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 64 (1999) [hereinafter COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE] ("At least every five
years since Gideon was decided, a major study has been released finding that indigent
defense is inadequate.").
185. See generalyCONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S CONTINUING
NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009); BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, ELIGIBLE FOR JUSTICE: GUIDELINES FOR APPOINTING DEFENSE COUNSEL (2008);
Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant's Right to Counsel, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1213 (2006); Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in
Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2006); NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND
EDUc. FUND, ASSEMBLY LINE JUSTICE: MISSISSIPPI'S INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS (2003);
GIDEON'SBROKEN PROMISE, supra note 175.
186. Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor. The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1843 (1994).
187. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, Strickland v. Washington: Gutting Gideon and Providing
Cover for Incompetent Counsel, in WE DISSENT: TALKING BACK TO THE REHNQUIST
COURT 188,194 (Michael Avery ed., 2009) ("[S]ince Strickland [which defined the standard
for ineffective assistance of counsel] was decided, the Supreme Court has found ineffective
assistance of counsel in only three cases, all of which were capital cases. Not a single
noncapital ineffective assistance of counsel case -where ineffectiveness was the main issue
the Court sought to review-has been heard by the Supreme Court since Strickland was
decided."); Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise ofAccuracy in
Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1603 (2005) (noting that the Strickland test
"does not capture modest errors that turn out to have momentous consequences, such as
failure to track down additional witnesses"). See also Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up
Gideon's Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2003) (arguing that while the
Supreme Court must share the blame for not vigorously enforcing the right to quality
counsel, other actors-including defense lawyers themselves-are also at fault).
188. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (eliminating federal funding for Death Penalty Resource Centers);
COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 184, at 93 ("What bothered the critics was not that
the [death penalty resource] centers were too costly, but that they were too effective.").
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career. One notorious ad featured a visibly emotional parent chastising
Kaine for "voluntarily represent[ing] the person who murdered my son."
The grieving parent then alleged, "Tim Kaine says that Adolf Hitler
doesn't qualify for the death penalty."' 9 By humanizing those accused of
monstrous acts, the reasoning goes, defense lawyers are themselves
monsters. Deval Patrick received similar treatment during his run for
Massachusetts governor. While in private practice, Patrick had worked on
the appeal of a man sentenced to death for killing a police officer.
Patrick's opponent ran an ad asking, "While lawyers have a right to defend
admitted cop-killers, do we really want one as our governor?" 190
This context helps to make some sense of Pentagon official Charles D.
Stimson's infamous attack on the pro bono efforts of elite American law
firms that have defended detainees in the war on terror. According to
Stimson, "when corporate C.E.O.'s [sic] see that those firms are
representing the very terrorists who hit their bottom line back in 2001,
those C.E.O.'s [sic] are going to make those law firms choose between
representing terrorists or representing reputable firms."' 19  Stimson was
not alone. A year before Stimson's attacks, Deroy Murdock of the
National Review was already impugning the efforts of the Guantanamo
habeas lawyers. Murdock ends with a call to arms designed to highlight
the lunacy of providing adequate defense counsel: "So, join al Qaeda, fall
into allied hands, land in Guantanamo, and top-flight U.S. lawyers will
fight for your freedom while the Great Satan's captains of industry
unwittingly underwrite your legal expenses. Only in America. ' ' 192 Debra
Burlingame, co-founder of the victim-advocacy group 9/11 Families for a
Safe & Strong America, strikes a similar theme. "Lawyers can literally get
us killed," she says and accuses the Guantanamo defense lawyers of
"subvert[ing] the truth and transform[ing] the Constitution into a lethal
weapon in the hands of our enemies."' 93
VII. INNOCENCE
To this point I have focused on connections between the wars on
crime and terror that point towards harshness. But there is one final
comparison worth our attention, and it pushes back in the other direction.
189. Editorial, Death Penalty Smear, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2005, at A16.
190. DeWayne Wickham, In Boston, the Smell of a Dirty Trick, USA TODAY, Oct. 17,
2006, at A19.
191. Neil A. Lewis, Official Attacks Top Law Firms over Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
13, 2007, at Al.
192. Deroy Murdock, Gitmo Legal- Why Are Top-Notch Law Firms Aiding Gitmo
Detainees?, NAT'L REV., Dec. 5, 2005, at 28, 29.
193. Debra Burlingame, Commentary, Gitmo's Guerrilla Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Mar.
8, 2007, at A17.
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This is the innocence movement, which has done something to shake the
certainty with which our nation has prosecuted both wars.
Not long after Guantanamo Bay opened, reports began to emerge that
some of the suspects held there were innocent. 94 That innocent people had
been hauled to Guantanamo was of little surprise to those familiar with
errors in our domestic criminal system. After all, our criminal system errs
most often in cases where informant testimony plays a large role, defendants
are not caught at the scene, and defendants do not confess or confess in
unreliable circumstances (such as coercion).195 These circumstances marked
many of the arrests in the war on terror. Initially, however, the Bush
administration and its allies in the media mocked these suggestions, much as
defenders of the domestic criminal system long scoffed at the notion that
innocents were on death row. In both cases, the arguments were the same:
we have extensive screening processes so that only the worst of the worst get
to Guantanamo, just as we have elaborate procedural protections to ensure
that only the guiltiest of the guilty end up on death row.
Even in individual cases where the evidence of innocence was
overwhelming, the government fought tenaciously against release. Clive
Stafford Smith, an anti-death penalty crusader turned Guantanamo detainee
advocate, describes this dynamic in one of his Guantanamo cases. The
government had long alleged that Smith's client appeared in a video linking
him to terrorism. Even after a BBCNewsnight report produced compelling
evidence that the man in the video was not Smith's client, the government still
refused to relinquish its case. Instead, the government simply said that rather
than being in the tape, he was only "suspected" of being in the tape.'96
194. E.g., MARGULIES, supra note 23, at 65. According to Karen Greenberg,
Recent interviews with troops from the early days at Guantanamo confirm that
the 'worst of the worst' charge was suspect from the very first encounters with
the detainees. There wasn't any reliable vetting.... Overall, the U.S. military
was blindsided by who they received at Gitmo and by the condition in which the
detainees arrived. Arriving dehydrated, and start[1]ingly thin, the detainees were
mostly not only small and weak, but did not even speak the languages which the
troops on the ground had been told to expect. Many came from countries
outside of the Afghanistan/Pakistan area. Some did not even seem capable of
any dire acts. Among the earliest arrivals, one was apparently an octogenarian;
another was over ninety. One was a diagnosed schizophrenic. However possible
the danger quotient of these first arrivals, the inclusion of these cases made the
team at Gitmo suspect that the vetting process had been haphazard at best.
Scott Horton, Six Questions for Karen Greenberg, Author of The Least Worst Place,
HARPER'S MAG., Feb. 2009, http://harpers.org/archive/2009/02/hbc-9000 4 42 3 .
195. Brown, supra note 187, at 1596. As Brown importantly reminds us, the risk of
error in the criminal justice system affects guilty defendants as well, because some
defendants are guilty of something but end up being erroneously overcharged. Id. For a
comprehensive review of wrongful convictions in the domestic criminal justice system, see
WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE (Saundra D. Westervelt & John
A. Humphrey eds., 2001).
196. SMITH, supra note 169, at 254-56.
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Domestic prosecutors have sometimes been just as reluctant to accept
that they were wrong, even in cases where the evidence was overwhelming.
I once represented a client who had served over a decade in prison before
Laura Hankins, a public defender and attorney at the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, took his case and those of his two friends. Hankins's
meticulous reinvestigation of the case produced exculpatory evidence
sufficiently compelling that Nightline picked up the story. The accused
men had time-stamped receipts proving their alibi-that they were
shopping at a nearby mall-which made it physically impossible for them
to have reached the crime scene in time.197 I still show the Nightline video
to my first year criminal procedure students, who every year remain
flabbergasted that the prosecutors refused to relent after seeing the proof
of innocence.19
Despite these obstacles, the innocence movement has raised important
questions about the accuracy of our criminal justice system.'99 As the
empirical evidence of innocent people convicted mounts, z°° it has become
increasingly difficult for even staunch defenders of the system to deny its
flaws.2" 1 Numerous states have launched task forces or commissioned
197. Nightline: Beyond Reasonable Doubt (ABC television broadcast Aug. 4, 2000).
After the Nghtline piece aired, the two men who remained in prison were granted new
trials and released on bond. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 17
(2000).
198. A closely related phenomenon is the tenacity some prosecutors show in fighting
defense requests to test DNA or other forensic evidence. This evidence, after all, would
verify guilt if the conviction were accurate. Liebman, supra note 150, at 2050 n.84.
199. The innocence movement has not been the only force mitigating the punitive turn
our criminal system has taken. Concerns about the rising cost of incarceration have also
had an impact; cost has led some states to repeal mandatory minimums for certain offenses,
lower maximum penalties, provide treatment rather than incarceration in some situations,
and require sentencing commissions to provide "resource impact statements" with their
recommendations. Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1285-90 (2005).
200. See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 207-08 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting)
("[T]he period starting in 1989 has seen repeated exonerations of convicts under death
sentences, in numbers never imagined before the development of DNA tests."); Gross,
supra note 27 (outlining what we know-and do not yet know-about the numbers of
wrongly convicted defendants); D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted- An Empirically
Justified Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2007) (examining
empirical data of wrongful conviction rate for capital rape-murders); Innocence Project,
Fact Sheet: Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exoneration, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
Content/351.php# (last visited April 30, 2009) (reporting and analyzing data on all U.S.
post-conviction exonerations by DNA evidence).
201. Conservative columnist and death penalty supporter George Will concluded, after
reading a book by Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld, and Jim Dwyer detailing the stories of the
wrongfully convicted, that some innocent people must have been convicted since the death
penalty's reinstatement. George F. Will, Innocent on Death Row, WASH. POST, Apr. 6,
2000, at A23. See also Brown, supra note 187, at 1594 ("DNA analysis is decisive in only a
small minority of cases, but the forms of evidence that it has proven to be unreliable-other
forensic analysis, eyewitnesses, informant testimony-are extremely widespread.
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studies examining the causes of error in their systems.2 2 Nationwide, the
number of executions has declined,2"3 as has support for the death
penalty.2"
In some unlikely places, prosecutors have even been able to run for
office on reform platforms."' Dallas County, Texas, was once known as
"the one county that you did not wanna get accused of a crime in, because
in this county, if you got charged with a crime you were likely gonna go to
prison."2"6 In 2006, a new district attorney, Craig Watkins, was elected and
his office is now spending state funds to re-examine past convictions.
Watkins also invited the Innocence Project of Texas to review cases back
to the 1970s involving DNA evidence, which has resulted in clearing the
convictions of at least seventeen men.2 7  That followed other reforms,
including the use of the open-file policy of the Tarrant County District
Attorney's Office, which allows defense attorneys access to some of the
prosecutors' evidence.2 8
Finally, while it is always perilous to speculate as to what may have
caused changes in judges' thinking, it is worth noting that the increased
proof of innocence coincided with more rigorous review of the domestic
criminal justice system by Supreme Court Justices Sandra Day O'Connor
and Anthony Kennedy. Justice O'Connor-a supporter of the death
penalty since her time in the Arizona legislature-provided the deciding
vote to the conservative majority in several death penalty cases during her
Adjudication has repeatedly failed to detect these errors, and that has not escaped public
notice."). But see Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. at 198 (Scalia J., concurring) (quoting a New
York Times article by an Oregon district attorney estimating that American criminal
convictions have an error rate of less than 0.027%); id. at 193 ("Reversal of an erroneous
conviction on appeal or on habeas, or the pardoning of an innocent condemnee through
executive clemency, demonstrates not the failure of the system but its success.").
202. Helen Shin, Is the Death of the Death Penalty Near? The Impact of Atkins and
Roper on the Future of Capital Punishment for Mentally 11 Defendants, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 465,495 (2007). See also Liebman, supra note 150, at 2140 n.264.
203. TRACY L. SNELL, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 2007-STATISTICAL TABLES, AT TBL. 9 EXECUTIONS, 1930-2008, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj. gov/bjs/glance/exe.htm.
204. While a majority of Americans polled still support the death penalty, in 2006- for
the first time in two decades-a slight majority preferred life without parole when
presented with that option. Jeffrey M. Jones, Support for the Death Penalty 30 Years After
the Supreme Court Ruling, GALLUP NEWS SERV., Jun. 30, 2006, http://www.gallup.com/
poll/23548/Support-Death-Penalty-Years-After-Supreme-Court-Ruling.aspx.
205. Radley Balko, Is This America's Best Prosecutor?, REASON, Apr. 7, 2008,
http://www.reason.com/news/show/125596.html.
206. 60 Minutes DNA Helps Free Inmate After 27 Years (CBS News television
broadcast May 4, 2008), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/O5/02/60minutes/
main4065454.shtml.
207. Id.
208. John Council, New Open-File Policy Includes Appellate Info. TEX. LAW., Oct. 10,
2006, available athttp://www.law.comljsp/tx/PubArticleTX.jsp?id=1202425008168&slreturn=l.
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time on the Court. °9 In 1989 she wrote the majority opinion ruling that a
mentally retarded murderer with the reasoning capacity of a seven-year-
old could be executed. 21' But by 2002 she had reversed her view, joining
five other justices in Atkins v. Virginia in ruling that "death is not a
suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal. 2  So too with
Justice Kennedy, who voted to uphold the death penalty for some juvenile
offenders in 1989,212 but wrote the majority opinion overturning that
holding sixteen years later in Roper v. Simmons.
213
In between those reversals, both justices made some startlingly candid
statements about the criminal justice system. In 2001, Justice O'Connor
gave a speech in which she said, "If statistics are any indication, the system
may well be allowing some innocent defendants to be executed. ' 214 She
pointed out that "[s]erious questions are being raised about whether the
death penalty is being fairly administered in this country" and argued that
we should "look at minimum standards for appointed counsel in death
cases and adequate compensation for appointed counsel when they are
used., 215 For Justice Kennedy's part, he gave a highly publicized speech in
2003 to the American Bar Association in which he discussed the
"inadequacies-and the injustices-in our prison and correctional
systems., 21 6  He argued that the entire legal profession holds a
responsibility to convicted individuals to improve our correctional system.
In particular, he noted the issues of racial disparities in prison systems, the
high cost of imprisoning people, and the severity of punishments within
our criminal justice system.
217
Even if confidence in the domestic criminal system has been somewhat
undermined by the evidence of innocents being convicted, it is unclear
whether the same thing will happen in the context of the war on terror.
The evidence of innocence is certainly present, as administration and
military officials have occasionally admitted.28 A study conducted in 2006
209. Editorial, Justice O'Connor on Executions, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at Al 6.
210. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
211. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
212. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
213. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
214. Justice O'Connor on Executions, supra note 209.
215. Id
216. Kennedy, A.B.A. Speech, supra note 66.
217. Id.
218. According to an anonymous CIA operative speaking to a PBS television station
in April 2004, "[o]nly like ten percent of the people at Guantanamo are really dangerous,
[and] should be there, and the rest are people that don't have anything to do with it."
SMITH, supra note 169, at 163. "Sometimes we just didn't get the right folks," Major-
General Jay Hood, then commander at Guantanamo, told the Wall Street Journal in
January 2005. Id. And a former interrogator told the Wisconsin State Journal in August
2004 that "[t]here are a large number of people at Guantanamo who shouldn't be there.
They have no meaningful connection to al-Qaeda or the Taliban." Id
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by Mark and Joshua Denbeaux revealed staggering numbers pertaining to
the possible innocence of many detainees at Guantanamo Bay. The study
found that for fifty-five percent of the detainees, there is no determination
that they have committed any hostile acts against the United States or its
allies, and that forty percent of the detainees have no connection with al-
Qaeda. Only eight percent have fought for a terrorist group, while sixty
percent are accused of merely being 'associated with' terrorists-the
lowest such categorization possible.219 Many were also affiliated with
groups not on the Department of Homeland Security's terrorist
watchlist.22
Was Justice Kennedy, the deciding vote in Boumediene v. Bush,221
influenced by the increasing evidence that many innocent men had been
swept into Guantanamo? Did this influence him to be less deferential to
the government's claim that courts should stay out of the way and trust the
executive? Is this part of what he had in mind when he discussed the value
of the great writ of habeas corpus as a hedge against "the practice of
arbitrary imprisonments," which "have been, in all ages, the favorite and
most formidable instruments of tyranny?""22 After all, Kennedy openly
expressed his doubts about the government's proposed tribunals, noting
that "even where all the parties involved in this process act with diligence
and in good faith, there is considerable risk of error in the tribunal's
findings of fact." '223 Given the influence that the evidence of innocence
appears to have had on his domestic criminal law jurisprudence, there is
reason to suspect that Kennedy had similar concerns in the terror context.
In the same vein, it is worth paying careful attention to the future habeas
proceedings and trials of terror detainees. In the first habeas hearing after
the Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene, U.S. District Court Judge
Richard Leon ordered the government to free five detainees because the
evidence against them was too weak to stand up in court.224 Evidence that
the executive branch detained innocent people is likely to continue to be
the strongest argument available for those who would restrain the
harshness with which we prosecute the war on terror.225
219. MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, REPORT ON GUANTANAMO
DETAINEES: A PROFILE OF 517 DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE DATA 2 (2006), http://law.shu.edu/news/guantanamo-report-final-2O08-06.pdf.
220. Id.
221. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).
222. DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX, supra note 219, at 14 (quoting ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, FEDERALIST No. 84).
223. Id. at 56.
224. William Glaberson, Judge Declares Five Detainees Held Illegally, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 2008, at Al.
225. Even if the detainee is found guilty, evidence that the executive branch
significantly overstated her role in terrorism may also cause courts to be skeptical.
Consider what happened to Salim Hamdan. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006),
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VIII. CONCLUSION: WAR METAPHORS
Throughout this article, I have attempted to show how, in some
important ways, 9/11 did not change everything. In comparing the war on
terror with our domestic war on crime, I have tried to raise questions
about how we have prosecuted both. There is one final analogy that is
worth our consideration, one which might help explain all the others. It
concerns the very metaphor of war.
From the inception of the war on terror, many criticized the Bush
administration's use of a "war" approach, instead arguing for what they
called a "law enforcement" approach.226 The Obama administration has,
for its part, signaled that it will no longer use the term "war on terror."
But one of the lessons of this Article is that American "law enforcement"
can be quite war-like in its approach, so there may be less gained from
the rebranding than advocates of the "law enforcement" approach might
hope.
Indeed, it is worth remembering that our current law enforcement
approach was-just like the war on terror-originally presented and
defended as a series of wars. The first war was on crime, and closely
thereafter the nation launched the war on drugs. The arguments
themselves were similar. Like the advocates of harsh tactics in the war on
terror, domestic crime warriors have also claimed to be combating a new
Justice Kennedy listed the litany of crimes the government asserted Hamdan had
committed: "[he] stands accused of overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy terrorism:
delivering weapons and ammunition to al Qaeda, acquiring trucks for use by Osama bin
Laden's bodyguards, providing security services to bin Laden, and receiving weapons
training at a terrorist camp." Id. at 646 (Kennedy J., concurring in part). Two years later, a
military jury ended up acquitting Hamdan of some of these charges and convicting him of
others. Free to select any sentence up to life, the jury sentenced Hamdan to less than six
years-including time served. He was free just a few months later. Jess Bravin, Hamdan
Jury Felt Evidence Didn't Back US. Claim, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2008, at A3. Hamdan
was released in January 2009 to his family in Yemen. Yemen Releases Former bin Laden
Driver from Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2009, at A9. One might think that one of the "worst
of the worst" would be found deserving of more than six years in prison. If the executive
branch's threat assessment continues to prove unreliable, courts may be less likely to defer
in the future.
226. See, e.g., JAMES RENWICK & GREGORY F. TREVERTON, RAND CTR. FOR GLOBAL
RISK & SEC., THE CHALLENGES OF TRYING TERRORISTS AS CRIMINALS, PROCEEDINGS OF A
RAND/SAID COLLOQUIUM 12-13 (2008), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/
technical-reports/2008/RANDCF249.pdf. Defenders of the war approach to fighting
terror have ridiculed the law enforcement response as too soft. For example, in arguing
that alleged terrorists should not have access to civilian courts, the Wall Street Journal
argued, "This is war, not a car theft in Chevy Chase." Terrorists on Trial, supra note 162.
But the Journal's juxtaposition of terrorism with car thefts is misleading. Domestic crime
warriors have built a tough criminal justice system by invoking images of serious crimes
such as rape, murder, and gang warfare. And, as I have argued, they have been successful.
Against that history, it is clever-but ultimately wrong-to suggest that our domestic
criminal system is built to respond to relatively minor crimes like car thefts.
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breed of violence that is uniquely threatening and will only be contained
with an iron-fisted response. In arguing for harsh laws against drug users
and drug dealers in the 1970s, for example, New York Governor Nelson
Rockefeller said, "The crime, the muggings, the robberies, the murders
associated with addiction continue to spread a reign of terror.... Whole
neighborhoods have been as effectively destroyed by addicts as by an
invading army. 217 A generation later, California Governor Pete Wilson
echoed Rockefeller's characterization of domestic crime as form of
terrorism, calling on the state legislature to create a set of laws for juvenile
criminals that are "as unforgiving as the terrorism that's been inflicted on
innocent victims for too long now.
2 28
Because it is war, there will be casualties; innocent people will be hurt
as we hunt down the terrorists. "In a war like this, where our enemies fight
that way, I think the error rate is necessarily going to be higher than what
it is in other kinds of conflicts," argued Bradford Berenson, an aide to
Alberto Gonzalez during his time as White House Counsel. "That's
regrettable. It's also inevitable., 229 This too we have heard before. In
calling the fight against crime a war, advocates for harsher measures told
us we must accept that some innocents will suffer. James Q. Wilson, one
of the most well-known criminologists of the past forty years, said street
searches of innocent people, mostly black and Hispanic men, would be a
necessary sacrifice in order to reduce the violence on America's streets. In
a piece entitled "Just Take Away Their Guns," Wilson said, "[i]nnocent
people will be stopped. Young black and Hispanic men will probably be
stopped more often than older white Anglo males or women of any race.
But if we are serious about reducing drive-by shootings, fatal gang wars
and lethal quarrels in public places, we must get illegal guns off the
street.
230
Nelson Rockefeller, Pete Wilson, and James Q. Wilson all employed
rhetoric that both responded to, and reinforced, our fear of domestic
crime. They did so in service of punitive criminal legislation. Advocates
for the war on terror have chosen a similar set of tactics to accomplish
even more extreme ends. Like the crime warriors, and in part because of
the foundation laid by the crime warriors, they have largely succeeded.
227. MICHAEL MASSING, THE Fix 126 (1998).
228. ABRAMSKY, HARD TIME BLUES, supra note 76, at 220.
229. LICHTBLAU, supra note 5, at 25.
230. James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 1994
(Magazine), at 47.
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